Negotiating Past the Zero-Sum of Intractable Sovereignty Positions by Exploring the Potential of Possible Party Interests: A Proposed Dispute Resolution Framework for the Tobacco Tax Debacle between the State of New York & the Seneca Nation of Indians by Mayer, Kathryn A.
Negotiating Past the Zero-Sum of Intractable
Sovereignty Positions by Exploring the Potential
of Possible Party Interests: A Proposed Dispute
Resolution Framework for the Tobacco Tax
Debacle between the State of New York & the
Seneca Nation of Indians
Kathryn A. Mayer*
I. INTRODUCTION'
In 1994, the Supreme Court declared in Department of Taxation &
Finance of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. that legislation passed
by the State of New York imposing state taxes on cigarette sales made on
Indian reservations to non-Indians was facially permissible.2 However, by
August 13, 2010-over a decade after the Supreme Court issued its holding
in Attea-the State of New York's coffers remained bare of any tobacco tax
* J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, 2013; B.S.
American University 2010. The author would like to thank her parents, Joe and Chrystal
Mayer, for their unyielding encouragement during the writing of this note; and Kendra E.
Winkelstein, Esq., for her thoughtful guidance and mentoring during the summer of 2011,
which provided much of the inspiration for this note.
1 The terms "American Indian" and "Native American" are used interchangeably
throughout this Note in order to maintain continuity with statutory language and the
language of various authors and judges. However, it should be noted that both are
umbrella terms that have become increasingly personal. The same is true of the terms
"tribe" and "tribal," which are also offensive to some who feel the terms suggest Native
groups were primitive, or lacked advanced social and governmental structures.
Accordingly, the author makes every effort to use the specific Native nation or tribe when
referring to a particular group. The Seneca Nation refers to itself as a nation rather than a
tribe, and will be referred to as such throughout this note.
2 Dep't. of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros. Inc., 512 U.S. 61
(1994) [hereinafter Attea] (finding that:
(1) [A] federal statute conferring on Commissioner of Indian Affairs authority
to make rules and regulations with respect to sale of goods to Indians on reservations
did not preempt state regulation reasonably necessary to the assessment or collection
of lawful state taxes; (2) scheme under which quota was imposed on number of tax
exempt cigarettes that wholesalers could sell for resale on reservation, and imposing
recordkeeping requirements, did not impose an excessive burden on Indian traders;
and (3) requirement that retailers obtain state tax exemption certificates did not
impose excessive burden on Indian traders.).
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revenue from its Indian nations.3 In response to the state's embarrassing
failure to collect these taxes, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg
issued a few words of advice to New York Governor David Paterson on how
he might address the issue: "You know, get yourself a cowboy hat and a
shotgun ... If there's ever a great video, it's you standing in the middle of
New York State Thruway saying... 'Read my lips-the law of the land is
this, and we're going to enforce the law. "'4
Mayor Bloomberg's bellicose comment was directed at the Seneca
Nation of Indians,5 who twice before-both times in protest over New
York's imposition of cigarette taxes for sales made to non-Indians within the
Seneca Nation's borders6-blockaded a strip of the New York State Thruway
in what became a violent confrontation between members of the Seneca
Nation, New York State troopers, and New York State riot police.7 Perhaps
3 See Gale Courey Toensing, $130m Expected from Indian Cigarette Taxes Stubbed
Out: Awkward!, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Jan. 13, 2012,
Indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com.
4 Adam Lisberg et al., Bloomberg Tells Paterson To Cowboy Up, Crack Down on
Senecas Selling Tax-Free Smokes on NY Thruway, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 2010,
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-08-13/local/27072682_Ilcigarette-taxes-untaxed-
cigarettes-seneca-nation.
5 [Hereinafter "Seneca Nation" or "Seneca"].
6 Throughout this note, "non-Indians" is used to refer to individuals who are not
official members of the Seneca Nation.
7 The New York Thruway is a four-lane highway of which three miles pass through
Seneca territory near Irving, New York. This three-mile strip has become the
battleground between the State of New York and the Seneca Nation over issues of
sovereignty and money. See, e.g., Senecas Clash with Police over Tax Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/17/nyregion/senecas-clash-with-
police-over-tax-ruling.html%E2%80%9CSenecas%27, [hereinafter Senecas Clash]; see
also Lisberg et al., supra note 4. In 1992 a battle broke out between the Seneca Indians
and New York when New York tried to enforce cigarette and gas excise taxes for on
reservation sales made to non-Indians. See Senecas Clash, id. Over 200 Indians gathered
to bum tires and throw debris over an overpass which resulted in a 30-mile stretch being
shut down. Id. To control the violence, more than 200 New York State troopers with riot
gear were sent to the reservation. Id. The incident resulted in an injunction on tax
collection for New York's Indian Nations. Id. Protests by the Seneca Nation also
occurred in 2007, see Lisberg et al, supra note 4 (discussing New York's 1997
"crackdown on the [Seneca Nation's] longstanding sales of its untaxed cigarettes to the
general public" which led up to second state thruway incident in which "Indian nations
burned tires in protest on the highway"), and again in 2010, see Gale Courey Toensing,
$130m Expected From Indian Cigarette Taxes Stubbed Out: Awkward!, Indian Country
Today Media Network, January, 13, 2012, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/article/
$130m-expected-from-indian-cigarette-taxes-stubbed-out%3A-awkward!-72350 (detailing the
Seneca Nation and the Oneida Nation's response to efforts by the New York Department of
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Mayor Bloomberg's frustration was the result of several years' of legislative
and judicial failure to resolve New York's tobacco tax dispute with the
Seneca Nation.8 Or, maybe his anger and resentment stemmed from
something much deeper-as the conflict between the State of New York and
the Seneca Nation over state tobacco taxes is rooted in disputes over
sovereignty dating back to the years prior to the drafting of the Articles of
Confederation.9
Regardless of the motivations behind his off-color remark, Mayor
Bloomberg's statement to Governor Paterson made two things clear. First,
New York's legislative and judicial attempts to collect state tobacco taxes on
Seneca tobacco sales have not been met with the submissive compliance for
which New York had hoped; nor does it appear New York will gain such
compliance from members of the Seneca Nation any time soon.10 Second,
despite the Seneca Nation's longstanding refusal to observe New York's
state tobacco tax laws pertaining to Indian tobacco sales made to non-Indians
on reservation lands, New York politicians, legislators, and other New York
State officials are growing equally unyielding in their determination and
efforts to collect the tax.II
Not surprisingly, this uncompromising dynamic between New York and
the Seneca Nation has failed to produce a peaceful resolution in the tobacco
tax debacle.12 Instead, the adversarial adjudicative process which has hosted
Taxation and Finance to "amend[] the state's cigarette tax law and companion regulations
to require wholesalers and distributors to pay the $4.35-a-pack tax upfront on all
cigarettes sold to reservations" by "announcing they would no longer buy the famous
brand cigarettes manufactured by the Big Tobacco companies of Philip Morris"). Since
the injunction on tax collection was removed in 2011, New York has had little success at
collecting cigarette taxes from Indian Nations. Id.
8 Thomas Kaplan, In Tax Fight, Tribes Make, and Sell, Cigarettes, NEW YORK
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/nyregion/indian-tribes-
make-own-cigarettes-to-avoid-ny-tax.html?pagewanted=all, (noting that "New York's
governors have for years tried, and failed, to collect taxes from tribes for cigarette sales,"
and that according to the State Department of Taxation and Finance, "in the first six
months of 2011 . . . [New York's] Indian nations imported 9.6 million cartons of brand-
name cigarettes); see also id.,(detailing how a court ruling in the latter half of 2011
allowing the state to tax American wholesalers that supply cigarettes to Indian nations for
resale resulted in a significant loss of revenue by state tobacco wholesalers as Indian
nations dramatically refraining from buying name-brand cigarettes, opting instead to
stock their own shelves with Native brands).
9 See infra Section II.
10 See infra Section III.
11 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
12 See infra Section III.
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the dispute for the last several decades has made the situation worse. 13
Litigation centered on bitter and historically rooted accusations has required
both parties to repeatedly bargain over stubborn positions in a legal arena
that declares only one "winner" and one "loser."' 4 Yet, the historical roots
and contemporary interests fueling the conflict are too deep and complex for
a sustainable resolution to suddenly flow from a process with this simple
"win/lose" result.' 5 The tobacco tax conflict between New York and the
Seneca Nation-as it has been played out in the traditional legal arena-has
unfortunately become a "zero-sum game."' 6
This note seeks to address the complex and multifaceted reasons why
New York and the Seneca Nation have failed to resolve their dispute through
state and federal legislative and judicial efforts.' 7 It asks why state and
federal adjudication over the dispute has resulted in neither a change of heart
by New York, nor an increase in compliance by the Seneca Nation.' 8 It finds
its answer in the unsatisfied and increasingly hostile sovereignty interests
possessed by both the Seneca Nation and New York, and the unyielding
positions and stubborn requests to which they have attached themselves over
the years.19
To move past the zero-sum, this note proposes both parties consider a
good faith, interest-based negotiation approach, whereby both New York and
the Seneca Nation work together as equals to separate their positions on
sovereignty, from the dynamic and multifaceted interests their positions have
served to protect.20 Unlike in traditional legal processes, negotiation enables
New York and the Seneca Nation to put a variety of interests on the table,
where each can be heard, legitimized, and discussed independently from the
static positions they represent. 21 Conducting a negotiation among equals
requires both New York and the Seneca Nation to acknowledge and
legitimize-through their behavior-the feelings and beliefs about
sovereignty possessed by the other party. However, by conducting
themselves in this manner, New York and the Seneca Nation enable
themselves to make progress in a negotiation setting without having to
13 See infra Section III.
14 See infra Section III.
15 See infra Section IV.
16 See infra Section IV.
17 See infra Section IV.
18 See infra Section IV.
19 See infra Section IV.
20 See infra Section IV.
21 See infra Section IV.
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discuss the merits of each party's sovereignty beliefs. The result is a dispute
resolution framework in which New York and the Seneca Nation can work
toward agreement on the many worthy-but for far too long, hidden-
interests underlying the tobacco tax dispute.
Section II reveals how the same legislative and judicial developments
which gave us our modem definition of "Indian sovereignty," in American
jurisprudence simultaneously defined the parameters of state-including the
State of New York-and federal sovereignty. Section III provides an
overview of nearly three decades of failed legislative and judicial efforts
between states, the federal government, and Indian nations, to resolve the
dispute over state taxation of Indian tobacco sales to non-Indians on
reservation land. Finally, Section IV argues that this failure is the inevitable
result of the inability of traditional legal procedures to fully legitimize the
important interests behind the parties' stubborn positions on sovereignty-
thus creating a zero-sum dynamic. In response to this failure, the author
proposes a negotiation framework that operates outside the zero-sum. The
author sets forth a vision for a process in which both parties are free to
bargain over a wide range of possible interests independent of-and while at
the same time preserving-their unyielding positions on sovereignty.
II. BACKGROUND: THE SIMULTANEOUS EVOLUTION OF STATE,
FEDERAL, & INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY
Section II details the tenuous development of federal, state, and Indian
jurisdictional and sovereign boundaries, as each sovereign fought to retain as
much sovereignty as possible in light of threatened encroachment from
competing sovereigns. This section recounts the early historical events most
often credited with shaping the definition of "Indian sovereignty" under
American jurisprudence. It seeks to show how despite state trivialization of
asserted Indian sovereignty interests, states developed a parallel interest in
protecting their own sovereignty from encroachment-by both Indian nations
and the federal government-simultaneously to the creation and
development of the doctrine of "Indian sovereignty." 22 This parallel
development in sovereignty interests in light of the threat of encroachment
provides a compelling starting point for understanding the unyielding
positions related to sovereignty asserted today by both New York and the
Seneca Nation.
Part A begins with a discussion of the drafting of the Articles of
Confederation and the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 to show how tribal
22 See infra Section II.
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sovereignty was defined during the infancy of the United States Government.
Part B discusses the Marshall trilogy-three pivotal and still influential cases
which have established the standard for defining Indian sovereignty under
federal Indian law. Part C focuses on a series of treaties the Seneca Nation
signed with the federal government starting with the Fort Stanwix Treaty in
1784. These treaties-drafted and signed in America's formative years-
provide the foundation for the Seneca Nation's opposition to taxation by
New York. Part D focuses on modern federal Indian policy and how it has
shaped contemporary views on Indian sovereignty.
A. Early State and Federal Regulation ofIndian Nations
The contemporary dynamic between New York and the Seneca Nation
can trace its roots to the decentralized manner of government which
characterized the British colonial system.23 Unlike the wealthier Spanish
colonies, which could afford to centralize regulation of Indian affairs, each
British colony was in charge of drafting and executing its own "Indian
policy." 24 The relative autonomy over Indian affairs enjoyed by each colony
continued into the American Revolutionary War.25
By the end of the American Revolutionary War, approaches to the
regulation of Indian affairs began to differ by state. 26 Despite these
differences, most states were at least in agreement that maintaining peace
with the Indian nations was of increasing importance. 27 Defining the proper
relationship between states and Indian nations, however, proved to be more
23 See DEBORAH A. ROSEN, AMERICAN INDIANS AND STATE LAW 8-9 (2007) (noting
that by the beginning of the Revolutionary War, the British Crown retained the power to
execute all treaties between its colonies and foreign nations, while the colonial
governments handled matters regarding Indian trade). See also Robert J. Miller, American
Indian Influence on the United States Constitution and its Framers, 18 AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW REVIEW, 133, 137-38.
24 Miller, supra note 23, at 137-38.
25 Id.
26 See id.
27 See Miller, supra note 23, at 137-38 (noting that "The dread of Indians did not
end with the Revolutionary War . .. The fledging United States was a weak country that
needed peace and security after the Revolutionary War, not Indian troubles. Treaty
negotiations with the Indians during these years were affected by the United States'
desire for peace and its need to keep the tribes from allying with England."). See also id.
at 137 (detailing Benjamin Franklin's belief that "securing the Friendship of the Indians
is of the greatest consequence" (citing 6 BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, FORGOTTEN FOUNDERS:
How THE AMERICAN INDIAN HELPED SHAPE DEMOCRACY 65 (1982)).
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difficult.28 Part of the challenge was that the Indian nations were different not
only in size, power and possession of resources, but also in how they
interacted with non-Indians. 29 Thus, each state had its own unique experience
with the Indian nations within its borders that were sometimes vastly
different from other states.30 This common acknowledgement of urgency,
coupled with a lack of consistency by states in both their experience and
approach, made the regulation of Indian affairs a topic of great importance to
the drafters of the Articles of Confederation.31
Initially, many drafters of the Articles of Confederation believed they
could solve the "Indian problem" by deferring all issues regarding the Indian
nations to the federal government, which it envisioned would have exclusive
control in regulating Indian affairs. However, states with larger Indian
populations such as New York, South Carolina, Georgia, and Virginia,
argued that the role of regulating Indian affairs belonged in the hands of the
individual states.32 The result of the debate was a compromise:
The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and
exclusive right and power of... regulating the trade and managing all
affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the
legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or
violated (emphasis added). 33
This compromise offered little guidance about which powers over Indian
affairs were truly possessed by the federal government, and which belonged
to the state. 34 While this did not cause any immediate concerns, the
ambiguity of the clause quickly became an unavoidable problem.
28 See Robert B. Porter, Legalizing, Decolonizing, and Modernizing New York
State's Indian Law, 63 ALB. L. REv. 125, 126 (1999).
29 See id. at 127. (recalling how at the time of the American Revolution, some of the
most powerful tribes were those of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, also known as the
Iroquois, which included the Onondagas, the Cayugas, the Mohawks, the Tuscaroras, and
the Senecas).
30 See generally Miller, supra note 23, at 137-39.
31 See JOHANSEN, supra note 27, at 11.
32 Id
33 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 4.
34 While the Articles of Confederation stated that Congress and the states then had
concurrent jurisdiction over transactions with Indians within the United States, the action
was subject to state law. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 4.
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The Revolutionary War had burdened the newly independent country
with insurmountable war debt-necessitating a swift response by Congress. 35
Despite a robust Indian population out west that did not want to leave,
Congress decided to fill its purse by selling "unsettled" western land to
American settlers.36 When the Constitutional Convention commenced in
1787, tensions were mounting between settlers and Indian nations in the
west, and the looming threat of a possible Indian War weighed heavily on the
minds of the Framers. 37 The high level of concern by the Continental
Congress over the state of relations with the Indian populations led to the
creation of an "Indian department," which was tasked with handling all
Indian affairs. 38 States were not given a role in this new department. 39 The
Framers additionally penned the "Indian Commerce Clause," which would
become part of the newly drafted United States Constitution.40 In the Indian
Commerce Clause, the Framers explicitly gave the federal government-
35 See generally WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (2007) (exploring how popular movements and social unrest following the
Revolutionary War shaped the ratification process of the U.S. Constitution).
36 See id (describing how selling western land brought additional risks to as many
worried about the foreign use of Indian tribes against the United States).
37 See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 24 161 (Clinton L.
Rossiter ed., 1961) (quoting Alexander Hamilton who, in accounting for this fear, wrote
that "[t]he savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as our natural
enemies, their natural allies [Britain and Spain], because they have most to fear from us,
and most to hope from them."). See also 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 198
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962) (describing the Framer's interest in protecting against future
Indian attacks, and noting that Hamilton listed "protect[ing] . .. your western frontier
against the savages" in a "review of the variety of important objects, which must
necessarily engage the attention of a national government."); Robert G. Natelson, The
Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U.L. REv. 201, 235-
42 (2007) (detailing the Framer's fear of future Indian attacks). Cf President George
Washington, Third Annual Address (Oct. 25, 1791), in 2 PHILLIP B. KURLAND & RALPH
LERNER, THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, 531 (1987) (explaining his desire to foster
cooperation and neutrality with the Indian Nations, President George Washington said:
"It is sincerely to be desired that all need of coercion in future may cease and that an
intimate intercourse may succeed, calculated to advance the happiness of the Indians and
to attach them firmly to the United States.").
38 4 SMITHSONIAN INST., HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS: HISTORY OF
INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS, 29 (William C. Sturtevant gen. ed., Wilcomb E. Washburn
vol. ed., 1988).
39 See id.
40 Country of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985), at n.4
(noting that "Madison cited the National Government's inability to control trade with the
Indians as one of the key deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, and urged
adoption of the Indian Commerce Clause" to remedy this deficiency.).
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specifically Congress-the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations ... and with the Indian Tribes."4'
The Indian Commerce Clause, however, did not put an end to questions
over who would regulate Indian affairs, or what this regulation would look
like. Soon after the ratification of the Constitution, Congress enacted the
Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790-the first piece of Congressional
legislation in which Congress attempted to outline which regulatory powers
over Indian affairs belonged to the federal government, and which belonged
to states. 42 Congress intended the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 to
prevent future Indian Wars, and to protect against Indian nations entering
into alliances with foreign countries. 43 Congress also expressed concern over
the possibility that states with large and powerful Indian populations would
try to claim a "superior right" to trade with the Indian nations in their
borders.44 To enforce the federal government's superior right over states to
regulate Indian commerce, Congress mandated that all private individuals
wanting to do "trade or intercourse with the Indian tribes" obtain a federal
license.45 The license requirement also prohibited states from conveying
Indian land, and made the act of doing so an exclusive power of the United
States federal government. 46
B. The Marshall Trilogy: Paving the way for Modern Federal Indian
Law
Following the ratification of the United States Constitution and its
incorporation of the Indian Commerce Clause, Chief Justice John Marshall
authored three infamous opinions for the Supreme Court in which he
established the doctrinal framework still used today for interpreting Indian
sovereignty under federal Indian law.47 Chief Justice Marshall's three
41 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
42 ACT OF JULY 22, 1790, I Stat. 137.
43 See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
44 See Porter, supra note 28, at 151 (1999) (explaining that while the Trade and
Intercourse Act was an express mandate for states to stop entering into treaties with their
Indian tribes, it lacked enforcement power and states consequently continued to enter into
treaties with the Indian nations).
45 ACT OF JULY 22, 1790, §§ 1-3,I Stat. 137.
46 ACT OF JULY 22, 1790, at § 4 (providing that states may not convey land "unless
the same shall be made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority
of the United States").
47 See Ci-ARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE
SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, 25 (1987) cited in Miller, supra
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opinions-Johnson v. M'Intosh,48 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,49 and
Worcester v. Georgia5o-are appropriately referred to as the "Marshall
Trilogy." Together, these three cases showcase the United States Supreme
Court's earliest efforts to define Indian sovereignty under the new
Constitution. They also reveal a Supreme Court unafraid to limit state
sovereignty when control over the regulation of Indian affairs was at stake.51
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Johnson v. M'Intosh52-the first case
in the trilogy-established the federal government's superior power over
Indian land title.53 Guided by the European "doctrine of discovery," 54 the
Supreme Court held the conveyance of tribal lands to "non-Indian" private
individuals to come under the exclusive powers of the United States
government.5 5 Indian nations accordingly retained the right to occupy their
land, but were prohibited from selling or otherwise ceding their land to
anyone other than the country that "discovered" them-which in this case
was said to be the United States. 56
In the second case of the trilogy-Cherokee Nation v. Georgia57- the
Cherokee Nation asked the Supreme Court to issue an injunction enjoining
the State of Georgia from executing state laws which threatened to annihilate
the Cherokee Nation as a political entity, and which would allow Georgia to
seize Cherokee land for state use despite the land's protection under treaties
note 23, at 139 (noting that the legal positions taken by Indian nations today can often be
traced back to the cases in the Marshall trilogy cases which were "rendered at a time
when Indian affairs occupied a central position in federal policy [when] [m]ost Indian
tribes had not yet been included within state boundaries, [and] [i]n terms of both military
power and population, Indian tribes were a significant factor").
48 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 WHEAT.) 543 (1823).
49 Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. (5 PET.) 1 (1831).
50 Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. (6 PET.) 515 (1832).
51 See Miller, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
52 Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 543.
53 Id
54 See Miller, supra note 23, at 139 (stating that "Marshall relied upon the European
'doctrine of discovery' as granting the discovering nation both title to Indian lands and
the sole right to acquire those lands from the natives.").
55 21 U.S. at 587 (finding that the federal government possesses the "exclusive right
to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or conquest").
56 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574. See also Miller supra note 23, at 139 n. 44 (explaining
how Marshall's reasoning was borrowed from the practices of the English Crown prior to
its relinquishment of all property and territorial rights after the Revolutionary War,
whereby "[t]he Crown could grant title to others while the Indians still lived on the land
[because] [t]hese grants were only subject to the Indians right of occupancy").
57 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S.at 1.
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signed by the United States government.58 Before addressing the merits of
the case, Chief Justice Marshall first determined whether the Supreme Court
had jurisdiction by asking whether an Indian tribe was a "foreign state" under
the Constitution.59 Relying on the text of the Indian Commerce Clause,60 the
Chief Justice concluded that Indian tribes were not "foreign states" for the
purpose of finding constitutional jurisdiction.61 Instead, Chief Justice
Marshall determined Indian tribes were "domestic dependent nations" under
the Constitution.62
Ridding the Indian nations of a foreign status under the Constitution was
an enormous blow to Indian sovereignty. It effectively denied Indian nations
the right to trade or negotiate with any nation other than the United States.63
It also effectively decreased Indian nation self-sufficiency by creating a
relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government akin to that of
a "ward to his guardian" -thus officially creating the "trust" relationship
between the federal government and Indian nations that is still in place
today. 64
The dispute between the Cherokee Nation and the State of Georgia
continued in the third and final case of the Marshall Trilogy. In Worcester v.
58 1d. at 3-5.
59 Id. at 15 (declaring that "[b]efore [the Court] can look into the merits of the case,
a preliminary inquiry presents itself. Has this court jurisdiction of the cause?"); id. at 14
(finding the extent of the judicial power of the Supreme Court in Article 3, Section 2 of
the Constitution which extends Supreme Court jurisdiction to 'controversies' between a
state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects"); id. at 16 (finding
that in order for the Court to have jurisdiction, the Cherokee Nation must be able to sue
Georgia in the Court, which requires the Cherokee Nation to be a determined a foreign
nation in the sense that the term is used in the Constitution).
60 See id. at 15-16.
61 Id. at 15-16 (finding the Founding Fathers did not have intend for Indian tribes to
be considered foreign nations because "foreign nations" and "Indian tribes" appear
separately in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.").
62 Id. at 17 (writing for the majority, Marshal declared that "[i]t may well be doubted
whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United
States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations," [and] may more
correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations."). Cf id. at 21 (taking
the majority's finding one step further, Justice Johnson concurred with the majority
opinion while adding that he "cannot but think there are strong reasons for doubting the
applicability of the epithet state, to a people so low in the grade of organized society as
our Indian tribes most generally are.").
63 See WILKINSON, supra note 47, at 55-58. See also FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122-23 (Univ. of N.M. Press photo. Reprint 1971) (1942).
64 30 U.S. at 17.
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Georgia,65 Chief Justice Marshall reminded Georgia that in entering into its
treaties with the United States, the Cherokee Nation remained a "distinct,
independent political communit[y]" 66 that possessed the right to self-
government and existence as a state.67 Thus, Indian nation sovereignty-as it
existed within a "domestic dependent nations" 68 paradigm-was once again
found to be firmly under the control of the federal government. 69 While
federal control undoubtedly infringed upon Indian sovereignty, it also
provided a check on further encroachment into Indian sovereignty by
states.70
At the conclusion of the Marshall Trilogy, the "Indian nation" was
defined as a unique sovereign entity that did not possess the full sovereign
rights of a foreign nation, but yet was still separate and distinct from other
states within the United States. As a domestic dependent nation, an Indian
nation accordingly possessed the right to self-government and sovereign state
existence, but would always be under the "protection" of the federal
government.
C. The Seneca Treaties: Laying the Foundation for Seneca Opposition
to New York's Current Tax Scheme
In addition to the case law established in the Marshall Trilogy,7'
contemporary state and Indian sovereignty has been shaped by the historical
treatment of specific treaties between the federal government and the Seneca
65 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 515-58 (finding a Georgia law to be an "unconstitutional
interference" with the United States' relationship with the Cherokee Nation, after Samuel
Worcester, a white Christian missionary was found to have violated Georgia law when he
failed to obtain a license or swear his allegiance to the State of Georgia before he moved
within the limits of Cherokee nation).
66 Id. at 559.
6 7 Id. at 559-61; see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 1094 (1833), reprinted in 2 KURLAND & LERNER, THE FOUNDER'S
CONSTITUTION 531 (1987), at 550 (concurring with Chief Justice Marshall, Story noted
that "Indians . .. were always treated, as distinct, though in some sort, as dependent
nations. Their territorial rights and sovereignty were respected ... their right of self-
government was admitted; and they were allowed a national existence.") (emphasis
added).
68 Cherokee, 30 U.S. at 17.
69 See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of "Domestic Dependent
Nations" in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated,
and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 443, 481 (2005).
70 See id.
71 See supra Section II B.
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Indians.72 Shortly after the birth of the United States, the federal government
entered into a series of three treaties with the Seneca Indians: The Fort
Stanwix Treaty (1784),73 The Fort Harmar Treaty (1789),74 and The Treaty
of Canandaigua (1794).75 With each treaty the federal government attempted
to better define its relationship with the Seneca Indians, and signified the
triumph of federal power over states to regulate Indian affairs. Subsequent to
signing the treaties, however, the Seneca Indians faced a fierce struggle to
maintain their land in wake of an increasingly ambitious removal policy by
the State of New York. 76 This struggle reached its apex during 1842, and
concluded with the controversial signing of the Buffalo Creek Compromise
Treaty. 77
1. Fort Stanwix Treaty (1784)
The Fort Stanwix Treaty (1784) is believed to have resulted from the
failure of the United States government to consider the interests of the
Haudenosaunee-which at the time encompassed the Seneca Indians, and
which would later become known as the Six Nations78-when signing the
72 During the time of the Marshall Trilogy, the Seneca Indians were not yet an
official Indian nation. The Seneca Indians became "The Seneca Nation of Indians" as part
of the negotiations surrounding the Buffalo Creek Compromise Treaty. See ROSEN, supra
note 23, at 8.
73 Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1794, 7 Stat. 15, [hereinafter Treaty of Fort
Stanwix].
74 Treaty with the Six Nations, Jan. 9, 1798, 7 Stat. 33 [hereinafter Treaty of Fort
Harmar].
75 Treaty with the Six Nations, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44, [hereinafter Canandaigua
Treaty].
76 G. Peter Jemison, Sovereignty and Treaty Rights-We Remember, 7 ST. THOMAS
L. REv. 631, 634 (1995). In 1779, three years prior to the end of the Revolutionary War,
George Washington ordered Major General John Sullivan to lead an army into the Finger
Lakes region of New York where the Haudenosaunee were known to reside. Although
few lives were lost on either side, the altercation resulted in the destruction of over fifty
Haudenosaunee towns and an abundance of valuable croplands. Id.
77 Treaty with the Senecas, May 20, 1842, art. IX, 7 Stat. 586 (also known as "The
Buffalo Creek Compromise Treaty").
78 The Haudenosaunee was originally comprised of the Seneca, Mohawk, Oneida,
Onondaga, and Cayuga, but became known as the Six Nations in 1722 after the Tuscarora
nation joined the Haudenosaunee. See generally FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE HISTORY &
CULTURE OF IROQUOIS DIPLOMACY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY GUIDE TO THE TREATIES OF
THE Six NATIONS AND THEIR LEAGUE (1995); see also William N. Fenton, Collecting
Materials for a Political History of the Six Nation, 93 Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society 233-38 (1949).
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1783 Treaty of Paris to end the American Revolutionary War.79 While
initially much of New York's Indian population-including the
Haudenosaunee80-was neutral to the War, many individual Indians sided
with the British against the colonists.81 At the end of the war, the British
went north into Canada, but the Haudenosaunee-and thus, the Seneca
Indians-found most of their land settled by American colonists. 82 The
Haudenosaunee pushed back near the border of Pennsylvania, resulting in
frequent fighting and increasing tension between the Haudenosaunee and
local American settlers. 83
The weak and disorganized government created by the Articles of
Confederation at the end of the war did little to ease the tension or stop the
violence. 84 Further, the Articles of Confederation was unclear on how the
responsibility and power of regulating Indian affairs was to be divided
between federal and state governments.85 The State of New York took
advantage of the Articles of Confederation's vague language to make room
for American surveyors and future white settlers. To do this, it began directly
entering into treaties with Indian groups who lacked legitimate legal status
from the central government. 86 New York also began using Haudenosaunee
land for military bounty lands-an act which Congress strongly challenged.87
Yet, despite pressure from Congress, New York State Governor George
Clinton did not wish to cooperate with the federal government on the matter,
and accordingly failed to cease the state's practice of using Haudenosaunee
land for this purpose.88
While Congressional tension with the State of New York mounted over
the regulation of Indian affairs, Congress was growing increasingly aware of
79 See Jemison, supra note 76, at 634.
80 The Haudenosaunce included the Iroquois Confederacy and became the "Six
Nations" when the Tuscarora Nation joined. See id.
81 See id.
82 Id
83 Id
8 4 BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, ENDURING LEGACIES: NATIVE AMERICAN TREATIES AND
CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 46 (2004) [hereinafter ENDURING LEGACIES].
85 See id.
86 See id. (explaining that one such group lacking legitimate legal status was the
Haudenosaunee. The State of New York also permitted non-state entities, such as land
speculating companies to directly enter into treaties with New York.).
8 7 See LAURENCE M. HAUPTMAN, CONSPIRACY OF INTERESTS: IROQUOIS
DISPOSSESSION AND THE RISE OF NEW YORK STATE 63 (1999).
88 See id.
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Haudenosaunee activity for other reasons.89 With the Pennsylvania border
town skirmishes and knowledge of many Indians aligning themselves with
the British during the past war fresh on their mind, Congress grew deeply
concerned that conflict with the Haudenosaunee could interfere with the
safety of the colonies, as well as with American expansion westward into the
Ohio Valley.90 In 1784, Congress-asserting its federal sovereign power
over Indian affairs-entered into the Treaty of Fort Stanwix 91 with four
members of the Haudenosaunee: the Seneca, Mohawk, Onondaga, and
Cayuga.92
In the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, 93 Warrior Chiefs Joseph Brant of the
Mohawk Indians, and Cornplanter of the Seneca Indians, ceded land in both
the Ohio Valley and western New York to the federal government-a move
which subsequently provided a new Haudenosaunee border.94 In return, the
federal government promised the Haudenosaunee protection over
Haudenosaunee lands, as well as "[security] in the peaceful possession of the
lands they inhabit east and north of the same."95
Unfortunately, the treaty did little to help bring about the peaceful
environment of which it spoke because the State of New York had other
plans. New York continued to encourage settlers to engage in land "sales"
with the Indian nations regardless of whether the land was past the border
drawn by the federal government in the Fort Stanwix Treaty. 96 It also
brought great humiliation and frustration to several tribal leaders who were
distraught with grief and guilt over the large land concessions lost under the
treaty.97
89 Steven P. McSloy, Border Wars: Haudenosaunee Lands and Federalism, 46
BUFF. L. REV. 1041, 1049 (1998).
90 Jemison, supra note 76, at 634-35.
91 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, art. III, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15.
92 Jemison, supra note 76, at 634-35.
93 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, art. III, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15.
94 Jemison, supra note 76, at 635.
95 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, art. III, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15.
96 See HAUPTMAN, supra note 87, at 63-64 (describing how white settlers would
often obtain Indian land for very little and then sell it for a rather large profit); see also id.
at 64 (noting that "Land 'purchased' by state 'treaty' from Oneidas for fifty cents an acre
was sold for seven to ten times its original purchasing price.").
9 7 See BARBARA GRAYMONT, THE IROQUOIS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 16-17
(1971) (describing how the "Indians were extremely frustrated in their attempts to secure
a written copy of the American commissioners' speeches and the treaty."); see also id. at
278 (noting that devastating illness and factionalism among the tribes made it difficult for
the treaty to gain the legitimacy it needed to establish peace).
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2. Fort Harmar Treaty (1789)
The Fort Harmar Treaty of 1789 attempted to correct the enforcement
and legitimacy problems of the Fort Stanwix Treaty by essentially mirroring
the terms of the Fort Stanwix Treaty98-but this time under the protection of
the Indian Commerce Clause of the newly ratified Constitution. The Fort
Harmar Treaty confirmed the boundary lines for the Haudenosaunee
established in the prior Treaty, 99 as well as the intentions of the United States
to surrender its claims to Haudenosautlee lands east and north of the
boundary line called for in the Treaty.' 00 This time, the sovereignty of the
federal government over the state in its exclusive treaty making powers with
the Indian nations was made loud and clear.
3. Treaty of Canandaigua (1794)
While the Treaties at Fort Stanwix and Fort Harmar sought to establish
peaceful relations between the United States and the several Indian tribes
comprising the Haudenosaunee, the 1794 Canandaigua Treaty' 0 ' was
envisioned as a treaty to finally end the western Indian wars once and for
all,102 as well as cease fears of any Indian territory ever again aligning itself
with a foreign enemy. 0 3
98 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, art II, 1784, 7 Stat. 15 (describing how the Six Nations,
and especially the Oneidas were again "secured in the possession of the lands on which
they are settled").
99 Treaty of Fort Harmar, art. II, 1789, 7 Stat. 33. The Haudenosaunee and the U.S.
federal government agreed "to renew and confirm all the engagements and stipulations
entered into at the beforementioned treaty at Fort Stanwix." Id. at art. I.
100 Treaty of Fort Harmar, art. II, 1789, 7 Stat. 33. See also Barbara A. Mann, The
Greenville Treaty of 1795: Pen-and-Ink Witchcraft in the Struggle for the Old Northwest,
in ENDURING LEGACIES 135, 162 (2004) (noting how many native sources and traditions
suggest that man Haudenosaunee questioned the legitimacy of the tribal leaders' mandate
at Fort Harmar to enter into such an agreement).
101 Treaty of Canandaigua, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44. [hereinafter Canandaigua
Treaty] (also known as the "Pickering treaty" after U.S. Commissioner Thomas
Pickering). For an in depth historical analysis of the 1794 Treaty of Canandaigua, see
Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo, 758 F.Supp. 107 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
102 COHEN, supra note 63, at 419.
10 3 See WILLIAM N. FENTON, THE GREAT LAW AND THE LONGHOUSE: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY 637-40 (1998) (remembering the numerous
military conflicts fought between American forces and Indians friendly to the British).
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Unknown to the signatory parties at the time was that the Canandaigua
Treaty 04 would become one of the most important agreements regarding
Haudenosaunee-and eventually Seneca Nation-sovereignty to date.' 05 It
assigned and defined reciprocal obligations and limits by which the federal
government and the signatory Indian tribes agreed to abide.106 In particular,
the treaty gave federal recognition to the Haudenosaunee lands, and gave a
federal promise to the Haudenosaunee that "the United States will never
claim the same, nor disturb them or either of the Six [Iroquois] Nations ...
in the free use and enjoyment thereof but the said reservations shall remain
theirs, until they choose to sell the same to the people of the United States,
who have the right to purchase."0 7
This language form the Canandaigua Treaty108 was, and still is,
interpreted by the Seneca Nation to mean is has a jurisdictional claim to its
land under treaty rights to which the State of New York is prohibited from
infringing upon without consent from the Nation. 0 9 The Seneca Nation
interprets this jurisdictional claim to extend to most activities on their land,
including commerce-an obvious point of contention today."10
The treaty also redrew borderlines for the Haudenosaunee-a process
which in part required the returning of land to the Seneca Indians that had
been relinquished in the Fort Stanwix and Fort Harmar Treaties. 11' In
exchange, the Haudenosaunee tribes agreed to recognize claims by the
104 Canandaigua Treaty, Nov. 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44.
105 See ENDURING LEGACIES, supra note 84, at 46-47, ("[T]he treaty is not a treaty
of conquest, nor does it end a war. Peace had been already established between the
United States and the Haudenosaunee at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1784 ... Overall,
the Treaty of Canandaigua is a treaty between two sovereigns: the Six Nations on the one
hand and the United States on the other.").
106 See ENDURING LEGACIES, supra note 84, at 47.
107 Canandaigua Treaty, supra note 101, at art. II.
10 8 Id
109 See Public Hearing on the Matter to Investigate New York State's Attempt to
Collect Taxes Generated by Native Americans both on Indian Reservations and over the
Internet to Non-Native Americans Before the S. Comm. on Investigations and Gov't
Operations, 2009-2010 Sess. 7-8 (N.Y. 2009) (statement ofl C. Seneca, Co-Chair of the
Seneca Nation of Indians Foreign Relations Comm.) [hereinafter Testimony of IC.
Seneca] (explaining that that when combined with the language of the Buffalo Creek
Treaty Compromise Treaty of 1840, the Senecas read the language from the Canandaigua
Treaty to mean that "[N]o outside government, including the United States, has any
authority to tax or regulate us, our lands,. . . or interfere with our government.").
110 See id.
Ill Canandaigua Treaty, supra note 101, at arts. III-IV. See also COHEN, supra note
63, at 419.
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United States government to land in the Ohio territory, as well as to land
west of established American borders.1 2 The treaty was a federal affirmation
of the sovereignty possessed by the Haudenosaunee tribes to enter into such
an agreement with the United States independent of consent by the State of
New York. 113
At first the treaty seemed to have delivered on its promise to end the
threat of current or future devastating Indian wars, and gave hope to the
possibility of resolving longstanding conflicts between the Haudenosaunee
and the federal government.11 4 However, this hope was short-lived as critics
of the treaty believed it "had the effect of placing the tribes and their
reservation beyond the operation and effect of state laws.""l5 This was
entirely disagreeable to New York State Governor DeWitt Clinton. Despite
the signing of the Treaty of Canandaigua, Governor DeWitt Clinton's deeply
held conviction that Indians were destined to extinction led to an aggressive
removal policy which sought to transport New York's "Indian problem" to
the west. 116 Additionally, under Governor DeWitt Clinton's leadership, New
York expanded its claims of state jurisdiction over Indian affairs by asserting
criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by one Indian against another-
an intrusion the federal government had explicitly protected the Seneca
Indians against in prior treaties.17
112 Jack Campisi & William A. Stama, On the Road to Canandaigua: The Treaty of
1794, 19 AM. INDIAN Q. 467, 467 (1995) (explaining how the treaty "ended a turbulent
period of enmity that had threatened to engulf the fledgling United States in what would
have been a destructive Indian war").
113 HAUPTMAN, supra note 87, at 90.
114 See Campisi & Stama, supra note 112; see also HAUPTMAN, supra note 87, at 90
(noting "The treaty resolved longstanding issues that had never been resolved between
the Iroquois, most notably, the Seneca, and the federal government at the end of the
American Revolution.").
115 COHEN, supra note 63, at 419.
116 VIVIAN C. HOPKINS, DE WiTT CLINTON AND THE IROQUOIS, 8 ETHNOHISTORY
213, 214 (1961). See also HAUPTMAN, supra note 87, at 17 (explaining that Clinton, like
many others of the time, also viewed western and central Indian land in New York as the
ideal place to expand trade and transportation because the Erie Canal had just been
completed and the "transportation revolution" was well underway); id. at 3 (finding that
while these events brought great wealth to non-Indian settlers on these lands, it has also
been attributed to the "undoing of the Iroquois"). It should also be noted that it was also
no secret that New York Indian lands were rich with agricultural and natural resources,
and Clinton surely felt New York should claim its piece. Id. at 17.
Il7 See, e.g., Hatch v. Luckman, 118 N.Y.S. 689, 694-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909)
(reviewing a case where a man was sentenced to murder by New York authorities for
abiding by a Seneca Tribal Counsel ruling to execute a Seneca woman for practicing
witchcraft). See also Murray v. Wooden, 17 Wend. 531, 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837)
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4. Buffalo Creek Compromise Treaty (1842)
The battle between the State of New York and its Indian nations
intensified during the first half of the nineteenth century as completion of the
Erie Canal quickly turned the City of Buffalo, New York into one of the
largest cities in the United States."t 8 However, white settlers who flocked to
Buffalo were met with much resistance from the Seneca Buffalo Creek
Reservation that bordered the newly thriving city.l19 Seneca resistance to
selling their land made clear to eager white settlers that their dreams of
homesteading near Buffalo would require the removal of all Indian
populations which stood in their way.120 Some white settlers were able to
move past Seneca resistance by purchasing land bordering the reservation-
however, those who were not so fortunate began pressuring the federal
government to flex their muscles and push the Indians out.121
In 1823, John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War under President James
Monroe, responded to the settlers' anxiety by allowing the Ogden Land
Company to conduct a preliminary survey of the Buffalo Creek lands.122
While the Ogden Land Company put pressure on Indian nations to sell their
land, the Seneca Indians adamantly resisted, resulting in the appointment of
local Judge Oliver Forward to handle the disobedient Seneca Indians.1 23 On
August 31, 1826, Judge Forward, acting under the authority of the United
States government, brought about a settlement between the Ogden Land
Company and the Seneca Indians in a controversial treaty that reduced
(finding the validity of an Oneida Indian's land deed from 1809 despite the presence of
federal treaties prohibiting such intrusion).
118 HAUPTMAN, supra note 87, at 114-15.
119 See id at 101-02 (detailing the rapid increase in white settlers during this period
in history).
120 HOPKINS, supra note 116, at 216 (detailing Governor Clinton's belief that that
only removal of the New York Indian tribes to the west could truly solve the "problem of
New York Indians").
121 HAUPTMAN, supra note 87, at 114-15 (describing how many white settlers took
to lobbying the President to remove the Indians from the land so it could be opened up
for settlement by white settlers).
122 Id. at 119. Note that the Ogden Land Company was a group of politically
powerful and well-connected land speculators. Id.
123 Id. at 148 (noting how the Senecas withstood pressure by the Ogden Land
Company to sell their land). See also N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., REP. OF SPEC. COMM. To
INVESTIGATE THE INDIAN PROBLEM OF THE STATE OF N.Y., 1889-51, 1888 Sess., at 23
(1888) [hereinafter Whipple Report].
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Seneca land by 87,000 acres. 124 The treaty resulted in the ceding of several
reservations by the Seneca Indians, as well as the reduction of the Buffalo
Creek, Tonawanda, and Cattaraugus reservations. 125
It was not long before troubling accusations about the nature of the treaty
arose. Almost immediately after the signing of the treaty, allegations
surfaced that Judge Forward was paid by the managers of the Ogden Land
Company and that some of the Seneca Chiefs had been bribed to accept
terms that were grossly against their interests. 126 Red Jacket, a Seneca leader,
wrote to President John Quincy Adams regarding the Seneca Indians' great
opposition to the treaty.127 Red Jacket stated that the Seneca Indians were
only given two days to produce an answer on whether they would sell their
land, and that they were additionally threatened with being forcibly driven
off their land if they refused to sign.128 On March, 24, 1828, President John
Adams responded by meeting with Red Jacket and two other Seneca Indians
who pleaded with the President to investigate the signing of the treaty, and to
refrain from acting upon their removal to the west. 129 The meeting resulted in
the failure of the treaty to achieve ratification.130
124 See Seneca Nation v. Christy, 162 U.S. 283, 285 (1896) ("By a treaty and
conveyance on that day the Seneca Nation, by its sachems, chiefs, and warriors, in the
presence of a ... commissioner appointed by the United States, conveyed a tract of
eighty-seven thousand acres of [its] lands ... for the consideration of $46, 216,
acknowledged by the deed to have been in hand and paid."). See also Christy, 162 U.S. at
285 (stating the amount of land to be ceded by the Seneca Nation under the treaty);
HAUPTMAN, supra note 87, at 15-55.
125 Whipple Report, supra note 123, at 23; HAUPTMAN, supra note 87, at 15-55.
126 See HAUPTMAN, supra note 87, at 154-56 (stating that the criticism of Forward
was so high the judge wrote to President John Quincy Adams for support, explaining that
all parties, including the Seneca Chiefs were fully aware and knowledgeable of the
proposals, and that the Seneca Chiefs voluntarily agreed to sell their lands).
127 Id at 155-56.
128 Id. at 157.
129 See id at 158.
130 Id.; but see id at 159 (noting that while the Senate did not ratify the treaty it
issued a resolution declaring that failure to ratify the treaty did not mean it disapproved of
its terms. President Adams appeared to be somewhat persuaded by Seneca claims
because he appointed Richard Livingston to investigate the circumstances of the 1826
treaty). In his report, Livingston found the following evidence to suggest copious
amounts of fraud to have surrounded the signing: (1) the Seneca Nation was not willing
to sell their land without ten, not two, days of consideration; (2) interpreters for the
Seneca were bribed to falsely influence the Seneca to extinguish their right to their land;
(3) the Seneca Nation was under duress due to threats of federal removal; and (4) the
financial dependency of many Chiefs were exploited by Forward and the Ogden Land
Company. Id at 159-60. See also id. at 160 (noting that collectively, these factors kept
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Yet, federal government efforts to remove the New York Indian tribes
did not stop there. On January 15, 1838, the federal government signed a
treaty with the six of the New York Indian tribes whereby the federal
government provided land for their removal and resettlement in Kansas. 131
However, when past disputes over the previous Ogden Land Company ordeal
resurfaced and kept the Seneca Indians from complying, the federal
government shifted its strategy and moved away from its removal policy with
respect to the Seneca Indians.132 Instead, the United States government
negotiated a "compromise treaty" with the Seneca Indians which returned the
Allegany and Cattaraugus reservations to them, but left the Buffalo Creek
and Tonawanda. 133 The treaty stated that the United States would
"protect ... the lands of the Seneca Indians, within the State of New
York. .. from all taxes, and assessments for roads, highways, or any other
purpose." 134
Unlike most New York Indian territories that were less successful in
resisting federal and state demands to sell their land, the Seneca Indians
emerged from their signing of the Buffalo Creek Compromise Treaty of
1842135 with a federal promise to protect it from encroachment by the State
of New York. This enabled the Seneca Indians to secure its sovereign
boundaries and create an independent constitutional government-The
Seneca Nation of Indians.136 However, this did not sit well with the State of
New York, who in the latter half of the nineteenth century had successfully
removed most of its eastern Indian tribes to the west, only to have its efforts
to remove the Seneca Nation blocked by a federal treaty.137
In 1886, The Supreme Court found legislation taxing the Seneca Indians
which was passed by the State of New York during the Buffalo Creek fiasco
to violate federal treaties-further frustrating New York's efforts to exert
the treaty from resubmission to the Senate). See generally Granville Ganter, Red Jacket
and the Decolonization ofRepublican Virtue, 31 Am. INDIAN Q. 559, 570-71 (2007).
131 Treaty with the New York Indians, Jan. 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550. See COHEN, supra
note 63, at 420.
132 Treaty with the Senecas, May 20, 1842, 7 Stat. 586.
133 See HAUPTMAN, supra note 87 at 177.
134 Treaty with the Senecas, at art. IX (emphasis added).
135 Treaty with the Senecas, at art. IX.
136 See Testimony of J.C. Seneca, supra note 109, at 5; Porter supra note 28, at 138
(describing how the creation a constitutional republic for the Seneca. Nation can be
greatly attributed to the pressure New York provided in the "Seneca Revolution");
HAUPTMAN, supra note 87, at 12.
137 ROSEN, supra note 23, at 76; see id. at 79.
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control over the Seneca Nation.138 In an incredible blow to New York's
perceived sovereign power to regulate Indian affairs within its borders, the
Supreme Court disapprovingly told New York that its attempts at taxing the
Seneca Nation and other Indian nations was "a very free, if not extraordinary,
exercise of power over [the] reservations and the rights of Indians, so long
possessed and so frequently guaranteed by treaties." 39 The Court further
emphasized that "the rights of Indians do not depend on this or any statutes
of the State, but upon treaties, which are the supreme law of the land."' 40 The
Court confirmed that under the treaties Indians "were entitled to the
undisturbed enjoyment [of their] ancient possessions and occupancy" unless
removed by the federal government.141
By the turn of the century, the Court had unambiguously rejected all of
New York's efforts to impose a land tax on the Seneca Nation, making it
clear the federal government possessed the exclusive right to control Indian
affairs, and that states like New York were to adhere to the terms established
by Congress. As the treaty era came to an end, New York had been
transformed from a state government with an aggressive self-proclaimed
sovereignty right to enter into its own treaties with its Indian groups and to
tax Indian land, to one whose state powers had been limited by the federal
government's treaties, and whose state sovereignty had been diminished by
the Supreme Court in affirmation of Seneca's treaty rights to prevent state
encroachment.
However, despite this victory for the Seneca Nation, the Seneca Nation
experienced a massive change during the treaty era-finding its livelihood
138 In re The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 765 (1866) (reversing a
decision of the New York Court of Appeals which upheld New York legislation
providing that "[T]he failure to extinguish the right of the Indians . . . shall not impair the
validity of said taxes, or prevent the collection thereof."); see also 72 U.S (5 Wall) at 768
("This explanation . . . removes the inference that might otherwise be drawn, that the
legislature were encouraging .. . direct interference by the owners of the right of pre-
emption with these ancient possessions and occupations, secured by the most sacred of
obligations of the Federal government.").
139 72 U.S. (5 Wall) at 766.
140 72 U.S. (5 Wall) at 768.
141 72 U.S. (5 Wall) at 768-70 (reiterating the text of the Treaty of Canandaigua, the
Court affirmed federal acknowledgement that the "reservations" are the property of the
Senecas). See also id. at 770 (explaining that "[Until the Indians have sold their lands,
and removed from them in pursuance of the treaty stipulations," the Senecas retain their
original treaty rights, and that state taxation of these lands before removal was
"premature and illegal."); id. at 771 (describing the Seneca reservations as "wholly
exempt from state taxation," and thus, state taxation was "an unwarrantable interference,
inconsistent with the original title of the Indians and offensive to their tribal relations").
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and very existence as a people threatened by two governments, both of whom
were foreign to its people, yet claimed control over them. Understandably,
the Seneca Nation has consistently faced a very real and significant threat to
their sovereignty as a nation and as a people. Yet as the history of the treaty
era reveals, the sovereignty interests at stake for New York were also
challenged and shaped parallel to the development of Seneca Nation
sovereignty.
D. From the Indian New Deal to Self-Determination: The Federal
Policies That Shaped Contemporary Views on Indian Sovereignty
1. The Indian New Deal
In the early years of the United States, policies targeting Indians were
greatly influenced by fear of the unfamiliar "Indian Savage" and the
possibility of Indian wars. 142 These fears resulted in policies which
encouraged American Indian assimilation into white American-and thus,
Christian-culture.143 However, by the early 1900's, many of these fears
were beginning to subside just as assimilation policies were failing to
convince most Indians to give up their customs and culture in exchange for
the Anglo-American way of life.144 In light of these changes, Congress began
to disapprove of the large amount of federal resources being spent on the
regulation of Indian affairs.145 As a result, the federal government shifted its
focus to a government-to-government approach which stressed economic
development and the strengthening of Indian nation governments.146 The
federal government's new approach to regulating Indian affairs gave states a
new opportunity to reclaim some state control over Indian affairs which they
had lost during the treaty era. 147
142 See ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTARY 130 (2008).
143 See id.
144 See id. at 128.
145 Id.
146 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 142, at 130.
147 See Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 275 (1898) (holding that the State of
Oklahoma could levy a tax on cattle owned by non-Indians that were grazing on Indian
land because "[S]uch a tax is too remote and indirect to be deemed a tax or burden on
interstate commerce, so it is too remote and indirect to be regarded as an interference
with the legislative power of congress."); David H. Gutches, Beyond Indian Law: The
Rehnquist Court's Pursuit ofStates'Rights, Color-Blind Justice, and Mainstream Values,
86 MINN. L. REv. 267, 268 (2001) (explaining how the Supreme Court has grown
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One of the first policy responses to the federal government's new
approach came in the form of the "Indian New Deal"-led by John Collier
from the Bureau of Indian Affairs and legal scholar Felix S. Cohen, under the
administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.148 The Indian New Deal
was supposed to provide affirmation of statutory support for Indian self-
government, as well as prevent further loss of land for Indian nations. 149
Supporting President Roosevelt's views on Indian policies and the
foundations of the New Deal, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization
Act in 1934 (IRA).' 50 With the IRA, Congress attempted to restore some
self-regulatory capacity to Indian nations, while keeping the government-to-
government relationship between the United States and Indian nations
intact. 15 1
The Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 (ICCA) was another product
of the Roosevelt "New Deal" era that sought to promote strong government-
increasingly in favor of a new form of subjectivism which favors states' rights); Alex T.
Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian Law, 32 AM. IND. L. REV.
391, 392 (2007-2008) (noting that the adoption of a form of subjectivism which favors
states' rights "has not only allowed the Court to issue decisions mostly detrimental to
Indian tribes, but has also allowed the Court to assume the lead in determining the terms
of tribal incorporation within the United States political system, thus achieving judicial
supremacy in an area constitutionally assigned the Congress").
148 Patrice H. Kunesh, Constant Governments: Tribal Resilience and Regeneration
in Changing Times, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 8, 18 (2009); G. William Rice, The
Indian Reorganization Act, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and a
Proposed Carcieri "Fix" Updating the Trust Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO L.
REV. 575, 578 (2009).
149 See Kunesh, supra note 148, at 18.
150 Pub L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79
(2006)).
151 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) ("The intent and
purpose of the Reorganization Act was 'to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to
give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and
paternalism.") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1804, at 6 (1934)). See Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980) (stating
that the IRA exemplified federal concern with fostering tribal self-government and
economic development); 25 U.S.C. § 461 (ending the allotment of Indian land to
individual Indians); § 463(a) (authorizing the Secretary of Interior to return surplus land
to Indian governments that had never been settled); § 472 (mandating Indians receive job
preferences for federal openings in the Indian office); § 470 (allowing chartered
corporations to receive loans to promote economic development of their tribes and tribal
members); § 476 (authorizing Indian nations to adopt their own constitution and set of
bylaws for self-governance).
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to-government relationships.152 The ICCA called for a Commission which
acted as a tribunal in the adjudication of claims brought on behalf of Indian
nations against the United States.153 Indian nations could bring claims "on
the ground of fraud, duress, unconscionable consideration, mutual or
unilateral mistake," land claims, and claims "based upon fair and honorable
dealings that are not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity."
2. Indian Self-Determination
Despite President Roosevelt's enthusiasm for the Indian New Deal, the
American public did not share in his excitement. This caused the policy to
take a back seat from the beginning of World War II into much of the
1950's.154 However, in 1959 the first modern case defining Indian
sovereignty emerged when the Supreme Court unanimously held that state
law could not interfere with an Indian nation's right to self-government.155
President Lyndon B. Johnson further contributed to the development of an
Indian self-determination policy by supporting both the passage of The
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,156 as well as local initiatives by Indian
communities to advance his "War on Poverty."' 57
152 Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 70
(1946)) (omitted from the U.S. Code when the Indian Claims Commission terminated in
1978).
153 25 U.S.C. § 2, 60 Stat. 1050.
154 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 142, at 140 (explaining how Congress cut
funding for Indian programs during the Second World War); id at 141 (noting that this
unfavorable perception of Indian New Deal programs carried on into the 1950's when a
movement emerged wanting to rid the Indian of his special status to once again promote
assimilation into white society).
155 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (finding that "[t]here can be no doubt
that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the
tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians
to govern themselves ... The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority
of Indian governments over their reservations.").
156 The Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22, 1326 (2009) (amending
Pub. L. 280 by requiring consent by tribal governments to the assumption of state
jurisdiction over Indian Country). See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 64-
65 (1978) (upholding the amendment of Pub. L. 280 with an acknowledgment of the
significance and vitality of tribal governments in contemporary American legal
framework). See also Kunesh, supra note 148, at 28 (noting that the Indian Civil Rights
Act was passed right "at the height of the Civil Rights era," and "impressed on tribes
constitutional notions of due process and equal protection. The Indian Civil Rights Act
articulated these as restraints on tribal government action, but they resounded in
individual rights."); id. (explaining that "[t]ribal courts became the most significant
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However, it was President Richard Nixon who, in advancing Johnson's
policies, officially "inaugurat[ed]" the principle of "Indian self-
determination" by establishing a new discourse on federal Indian law policy
that touched both its philosophical and administrative arms.15 8 In his 1970
Special Message on Indian Affairs, Nixon offered the following outline for
the new direction for contemporary federal-tribal relations:
The first and most basic question that must be answered with respect to
Indian policy concerns the history and legal relationship between the
Federal government and Indian communities ... Th[e] policy of forced
termination is wrong ... The special relationship between Indians and the
Federal government is the result instead of solemn obligations which have
been entered into by the United States Government ... This, then, must be
the goal of any new national policy toward the Indian people to strengthen
the Indian's sense of autonomy without threatening this sense of
community. 159 There is no reason why Indian communities should be
deprived of the privilege of self-determination merely because they receive
monetary support from the Federal government... [T]he Indian community
should have the right to take over the control and operation of federally
funded programs .... 160
expression of tribal sovereignty and tribal culture, resolving all manner of disputes, and
defining the contours of tribal political and legislative authority, and intertwining
customary tribal law and traditions into their decisions."). But see id. (noting that "[t]he
Indian Civil Rights Act, like many other federal policies, reflects two sides of the
political coin. One side represents the federal government's paternalism and one of the
many federal mandates imposed on tribes irrespective of their status as a sovereign nation
with formal and customary systems of law and order.").
157 See Kunesh, supra note 148, at 28-29 (noting that the "War on Poverty"
programs encouraged Indian self-determination). See also ANDERSON ET AL., supra note
142, at 149 (detailing how Indian communities often benefited from President Johnson's
"War on Poverty" programs that emphasized local control, and that some Indian nations
even began to develop social services and educational programs for their own members);
id. (noting that the federal Office of Economic Opportunity supported on-Reservation
legal aid programs funded studies which revealed significant disparities between Indians
and non-Indians in health, education, and social welfare).
158 See Kunesh, supra note 142, at 28-29.
159 See President Richard Nixon, Special Message on Indian Affairs (1970),
reprinted in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States; Richard Nixon: 1969:
Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President (Univ. of
Mich. Library 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/tribalportal/pdf/president-
nixon70.pdf (July 8, 1970) [Hereinafter Special Message on Indian Affairs] (showcasing
Nixon's belief that Indian nations should head the development of this policy).
160 Id
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An abundance of Congressional legislation flowed from President
Nixon's remarks,161 even into following administrations, including the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEA),1 62
which allowed Indian nations to directly enter into contracts with the federal
government as part of their taking control over the administration of federal
programs for health, education, and general Indian welfare.163 Most recently,
President Barack Obama reaffirmed the federal government's commitment to
"strengthen and build on the Nation-to-Nation relationship between the
United States and tribal nations"'6 However, this federal policy does not
transfer to states that are under no legal obligation to adopt the federal
government's approach.
As Section III demonstrates, inconsistency and ambiguity between
federal treaties, federal statues, and state law over the regulation of Indian
tobacco sales on reservation land has created a confusing battle between
three sovereigns with no acceptable legal remedy.
III. SOVEREIGNTY & THE DISPUTE OVER NEW YORK'S IMPOSITION OF
TOBACCO TAXES ON SALES MADE BY SENECA INDIAN VENDORS TO
NON-INDIANS ON SENECA LAND
The historical events discussed in Section II laid the foundation for
defining Indian sovereignty under American jurisprudencel 65-however, this
definition is helpful only if the sovereign whose sovereignty is being defined
161 See, e.g., The Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1544 (2009)
(providing a revolving loan fund to promote reservation economic development); The
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, infra note 162; The
Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1603-83 (2009) (providing
funding for health care on reservations); The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (2009) (defining jurisdiction parameters on child custody proceedings
involving Indian children); the Tribally Controlled Community College Assistance Act of
1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1801-52 (amended 2008) (supporting tribal institutions for higher
education); the American Indian Religion Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C § 1996 (1978)
(amended 1994) (affirming Indian religious and spiritual practices).
162 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1975) (amended 2006).
163 25 U.S.C. § 450(f)(a)(1); Rebecca Anita Tsosie, What Does It Mean To "Build a
Nation"? Reimagining Indigenous Political Identity in an Era of Self-Determination, 7
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J., 2006, at 38, 41 (2006).
164 Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces Kimberly Teehee
as Senior Policy Advisor for Native American Affairs (June 15, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress office/President-Obama-Announces-Kimberly-
Teehee-as-Senior-Policy-Advisor-for-Native-American-Affairs/.
165 See supra Section II.
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is amenable to the terms of the definition, and believes them to be legitimate.
If a sovereign Seneca Nation and its people find the definition of Indian
sovereignty under American jurisprudence to be illegitimate, then they will
lack the incentive to obey any New York State regulations passed under this
"illegitimate" interpretation of their sovereignty. This reality is demonstrated
every time a Seneca tobacco vendor refuses to comply with New York's
tobacco tax regulations out of belief that federal treaties make him immune
from such taxes. This logic can also be applied to the State of New York, in
that it is less likely to abide by federal statutes or state court rulings if it does
not believe the outcome of such processes accurately reflect the sovereign
authority it believes itself to possess over the Seneca Nation. This is
evidenced each time a New York State official or policy maker acts in
disregard of a federal statute or state court ruling that limits how far the state
can go to enforce its regulations on Indian vendors and carriers.
Coming to an agreement about the definition of sovereignty as it applies
to both the State of New York and the Seneca Nation is greatly complicated
by the fact that the two parties do not share similar interpretations of the
history and case law that defined their sovereignty under American
jurisprudence. Section III chronicles how these differences in interpretation
resulted in legislative and judicial failure on behalf of the federal and state
government to resolve the tobacco tax dispute between New York and the
Seneca Nation.
A. Federal and State Legislative Efforts to Secure Indian Nation
Compliance
Four decades of legislative history surround New York's efforts to
regulate and tax Seneca tobacco sales. The earliest legislative efforts came in
with the Jenkins Act. 166 Enacted by Congress in 1949, the Jenkins Act was
created to prevent consumers from purchasing cigarettes from merchants in
interstate commerce without paying all excise taxes imposed by the relevant
jurisdictions.167 While it did not as a whole prohibit "retailers"1 68 from
selling cigarettes in interstate commerce absent state-imposed excise taxes,
the Jenkins Act served as federal mandate for all Indian and non-Indian
cigarette retailers to engage in periodic reporting to the applicable state tax
166 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 375-378 (2000).
167 Jonathan I. Sirois, Remote Vendor Cigarette Sales, Tribal Sovereignty, and the
Jenkins Act: Can I Get A Remedy?, 42 DUQ. L. REv. 27, 29 (2003).
168 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 375-78(1949) (includes both Indian and non-Indian retailers).
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administrator to ensure the collection of an excise tax from the buyer. 169
Originally it was hoped the Jenkins Act would both prevent the evasion of
state and local excise taxes on cigarettes, and keep interstate cigarette
merchants from claiming an unfair competitive advantage over in-state
retailers.170 However, the Jenkins Act failed to deliver this outcome when
Indian vendors and merchants operating from tribal lands-who are legally
permitted to market and sell tax-free cigarettes to members of their own
Indian nations17 ]-refused to acknowledge the Jenkins Act's reporting
requirements for tax-free sales made to non-Indians via the Internet. 172
This was problematic for the enforcement arm of the Jenkins Act which
originally stated that persons found in violation of the reporting requirements
"shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than $1,000, or
imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both." 73 The Federal Bureau of
Investigations ("FBI") was responsible for investigating violations of the
169 15 U.S.C. §§ 376(a) (2000). The Jenkins Act provides in relevant part:
Any person who sells, transfers, or ships for profit cigarettes or smokeless
tobacco in interstate commerce, whereby such cigarettes . . . are shipped into a State,
locality, or Indian country of an Indian tribe taxing the sale or use of cigarettes ...
or who advertises or offers cigarettes ... for such sale, transfer, or shipment, shall--
(1) first file . . . with the tobacco tax administrator if the State and place into
which such shipment is made or in which such advertisement or offer is
disseminated ...
(2) not later than the 10th day of each calendar month, file with the tobacco tax
administer of the State . . . a memorandum or copy of the invoice covering each and
every shipment of cigarettes ... made during the previous calendar month into such
State; the memorandum or invoice in each case to include the name and address of
the person to whom the shipment was made, the brand, [and] the quantity thereof..
170 See Sirois, supra note 167 at 29 (explaining that "[s]ince the relevant tax
jurisdiction will directly assess the consumer for the taxes owed on their purchase, there
is little incentive for someone to mail order or purchase cigarettes online when they will
incur the same costs. Indeed, it is likely a higher cost would be realized when shipping
and handling are taken into account .... ).
171 See Wash. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160
(1979). See also McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 170-71
(1973) (finding that "State laws are generally not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian
reservation except where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply. It
follows that Indians and Indian property on an Indian reservation are not subject to State
taxation except by virtue of express authority conferred upon the State by act of
Congress.") (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 845 (1958)).
172 See Karen Setze, Smuggling, Internet Sales Threaten States' Cigarette Tax
Revenue, ST. TAX TODAY, Sept.11, 2002, at 711 (explaining how Indian vendors stating
they are not bound by Jenkins Act has made the "tax issue . . . tangled with
considerations of tribal sovereignty.").
173 15 U.S.C. § 377 (1949), repealed by Pub.L. 111-154, § 2(d) (2010).
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Jenkins Act, while the authority to enforce its provisions fell with the
Department of Justice ("DOJ").174 When this arrangement was originally
established in 1949, the FBI and DOJ possessed adequate resources to
engage in their respective tasks, and thus ensure compliance.1 75 However, as
fears of domestic terrorism increasingly became the focus of both agencies,
the DOJ and FBI quickly found themselves lacking the necessary resources
and incentive to pursue violations on behalf of state revenue departments for
simple misdemeanors arising from the Jenkins Act.176
Lacking support from federal agencies to enforce the Jenkins Act, the
amount of Internet sales by Indian vendors for excise-free cigarettes
soared.177 States seized the lack of federal presence as an opportunity to
enforce their own statutes regulating excise tobacco tax collection.178 Unlike
the DOJ and FBI which have no direct involvement with state tax
administrators-and who are often the last to learn of a possible violation
under the Jenkins Act-states found themselves in the ideal position for
identifying remote Indian vendors, and accordingly took a unilateral
approach to encourage reporting compliance.179 It is therefore not surprising
that many remote Indian vendors turned out to be unwilling to comply with
state requests for information-especially as the requests were intermittently
made and carried no real threat of consequences. 8 0
States responded to this lack of enforceability under the Jenkins Act by
seeking out creative solutions which would enable them to combat the loss of
174 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNET CIGARETTE SALES: GIVING ATF
INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY MAY IMPROVE REPORTING AND ENHANCEMENT (2002)
[hereinafter GAO REPORTING], at 2, available at
http://www.gao.gov/news.items/do2743.pdf. It should be noted that the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") possessed ancillary authority to enforce the
Jenkins Act through the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act "which makes it unlawful
for any person to ship, transport, receive, possess, sell, distribute, or purchase more than
60,000 [3,000 packs, or 300 cartons] cigarettes that bear no evidence of state cigarette tax
payment in the state in which the cigarettes are found." Id. at 8. However, this scenario
was rare for Internet purchase, which ultimately limited the level of intervention by the
ATF. See Sirois, supra note 167, at n. 17.
175 See Sirois, supra note 167, at 31.
17 6 Id.
177 See id. at 48 (noting how the unwillingness of federal agencies to enforce the
Jenkins Act made the statute pointless since its provisions were enforceable only by
prosecution of interstate cigarette merchants under a felony criminal statute, which was
unlikely absent extreme circumstances).
178 See Setze, supra note 172 at 14.
179 See GAO REPORTING, supra note 174, at 4, 11.
180 See Sirois, supra note 167 at 53-54.
800
[Vol. 28:3 2013]
NEGOTIATING PAST SOVEREIGNTY POSITIONS
tax revenue resulting from claims to sovereign immunity evoked by many
Indian nations. For example, some states attempted to use their state powers
to regain control over the delivery channels used by cigarette vendors and
merchants operating from within Indian country.181 One way states did this
was to regulate the transportation of unstamped cigarettes. 182 By definition,
unstamped cigarettes are untaxed cigarettes. 183 As such, some states reasoned
they could levy an excise tax on unstamped cigarettes which would grant
them authority to seize any shipment of unstamped cigarettes' 84-including
those coming from Internet sales by Indian vendors. To successfully
implement these efforts, states enlisted the help of the common carrier
industry and gave all carriers 85 notice that the state was permitted to seize
any vehicle carrying unstamped (i.e. untaxed) cigarettes as contraband
material-including shipments of unstamped (i.e. untaxed) cigarettes coming
from Indian vendorsl86-absent special documentation explaining why the
shipment was unstamped.187 However, under the Jenkins Act, this strategy
was limited to the amount of state resources available to carry out such an
ambitious task, as well as by the willingness of common carriers to comply
with a state's regulations.'88
181 See Setze, supra note 172 (discussing steps taken by the state of Connecticut to
secure compliance).
182 See id. at 14.
183 See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 514
(1991).
184 Id
185 Under the Jenkins Act, a "common carrier" is defined as "[a] carrier that is
required by law to transport passengers or freight, without refusal, if the charge is paid."
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 205 (7th ed. 1999), contrasted with a "private (or contract)
carrier," which is defined as "the carrier that is not bound to accept business from the
general public . . ." Id. "For the purpose of cigarette delivery, remote vendors may
employ contract carriers that would not be party to the agreements with state revenue
departments to assist in the interdiction of deliveries of untaxed cigarettes." Sirois, supra
note 167 at n. 137.
186 See Setze, supra note 172.
187 Id.
188 See Sirois, supra note 167 at 54-55 (noting that "[A]s a practical matter, [this]
approach is only useful as a scare tactic; no state has resources so abundant that they
could interdict every shipment of cigarettes made via common carrier, nor would they
wish to expend valuable resources to seize what could ultimately turn out to be a two-
carton delivery."). See also id. at 55 (explaining that "[a]nother drawback [... .] is that the
state is at the mercy of common carriers that may or may not decide to provide
notification that it is in possession of untaxed cigarettes," and that "if a carrier does a
great deal of business with a particular vendor, it may decide that the risk of potential
legal challenges with a state is worth the future business with that vendor.").
801
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
On March 31, 2010 the United States Congress attempted to correct the
shortcomings of the Jenkins Act by signing into law The Prevent All
Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2009 ("PACT Act"). 189 As an amendment to the
Jenkins Act, the PACT Act was intended to once and for all solve the
enforcement problems of the Jenkins Act.190 The PACT Act provided new
definitions which explicitly stated its intent to reach certain parts of Indian
Country. 191 It also upgraded the crime of smuggling untaxed cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco to a felony.192 It was hoped such efforts would make it
easier for states to enforce their own taxation measures to sales made to non-
Indians regardless of place of sale.193
While these changes may seem small, their impact is not. In wake of the
enactment of the PACT Act, Indian nations-including the Seneca Nation-
have grown increasingly concerned with threats to their sovereign right to
engage in nation-to-nation tobacco trade with other Indian nations absent fear
189 15 U.S.C. §§ 375-378 (2009).
190 See e.g., MEMO FROM THE COALITION TO STOP CONTRABAND TOBACCO (April 6,
2010) (proclaiming in reference to the enforcement shortcomings of the Jenkins Act:
"After a long journey to get to this day, this bill is a win for law enforcement, retailers,
and state sale tax advocates.").
191 15 U.S.C. § 375 (2012). Of greatest concern to Indian Nations, § 375 of the
PACT Act gives revised definitions for certain terms including (but not limited to)
"cigarette," id. at § 375(2), "person," id. at § 375(10) and "use," id. at § 375(14). It also
expands upon the definition of "interstate commerce" to include commerce "between
points in the same State, but through any place outside the State or through any Indian
country." § 375(9)(a) -(b). Section 375(5)-(6) introduce and define the term "delivery
sale" and "delivery seller." Id. Also, it should be noted that the PACT Act expanded its
scope to include not only cigarettes, but smokeless tobacco as well. Id.
192 15 U.S.C. § 377 (2012). Section 377 of the PACT Act covers penalties for
"persons," defined at § 375(10), failing to properly implement the Act, or who violate or
aid persons who are knowingly in violation of the Act. Increased from the Jenkins Act,
civil fines for first time "delivery seller" violations are the greater of $5,000 for first
violations and $10,000 for subsequent violations, or 2 percent of the gross tobacco sales
of the delivery seller, made within 1-year of the violation. § 377(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
Common carriers or other delivery service will be fined $2,500 for first violations, or
$5,000 for any subsequent violations within 1 year of a prior violation. See §
377(b)(1)(B).
193 As the strongest and most inclusive piece of legislation to date which explicitly
addresses the state's ability to tax cigarette and other tobacco sales made by Indian
vendors to non-Indians, and which permits states the authority to unilaterally enforce
such provisions, the PACT Act was supposed to solve the New York cigarette taxation
enforcement conflict once and for all-but that did not happen. Instead, a zero-sum game
over sovereignty, in which a gain for one party decreases the acknowledged sovereignty
of the other, has resulted between the State of New York and members of the Seneca
Nation.
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of their shipments being seized by the state, or their members charged with
felonies simply for carrying out the nation's economic business. Under the
new terms of the PACT Act, this fear is not unfounded.
If nation-to-nation tobacco trade is "interstate commerce" under the
PACT Act, as New York believes, and, if Indian nation governments and
their members under the PACT Act are "delivery sellers," then it follows that
Indian nations under the PACT Act may have a difficult time circumventing
roadblocks to nation-to-nation trade as proscribed by state law, and enforced
by federal statutes. Similar to regulations under the Jenkins Act, the PACT
Act requires Indian nations and Indian vendors to comply with registration
guidelines for all Indian tobacco businesses. 194 This includes adherence to
reporting requirements to state tax administrators regarding Indian vendor
sales,195 transportation regulations for shipments of all cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco,196 and state stamping (i.e. taxation) requirements.197
However, unlike the Jenkins Act, the PACT Act subjects noncompliant
Indian vendors to both civil and criminal penalties for failing to meet the
Act's requirements. 198
B. Attea, and its Aftermath: A Contemporary Jurisdictional
Framework
The modern-day jurisdictional framework housing the dispute over state
taxation of Seneca tobacco sales to non-Indians on reservation land reflects
both a controversy over competing claims of Indian sovereignty, and state
complaints of unfair competition that are entrenched in both politics and
economics. 199 Within this controversy, Indian nations are subject to the
194 15 U.S.C. § 376. (2012).
195 Id. at § 376(a)(2).
196 Id. at § 377.
197 Id.
198 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
199 Sharon E. Claassen, Taxation: State Transaction Privilege Tax: An Interference
with Tribal Self-Government, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 319, 321 (1979) ("On one side are
the Indians, subject to the plenary power of Congress. On the other side are the states,
anxious to control what transpires within their borders and to raise revenues from
whatever source they can. There is currently strong Indian resistance to any state effort to
exert control over or to tax non-Indians doing business with the Indians. There is an
equally strong effort by the states to fill with state laws any void existing by virtue of
Congress' failure to enact governing legislation. Between them stand the courts,
hampered by Congressional inaction on the subject.") (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe
v. O'Cheskey, 493 F. Supp. 1063, 1074 (D.N.M. 1977).
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plenary power of Congress-however, states wishing to raise revenues in any
way they can often attempt to fill voids left by congressional inaction by
passing their own state laws and regulations. 200 This places courts in the
middle of the tobacco tax dispute between states and Indian nations, often
with little input or guidance from Congress on the subject.201
1. Setting the Stage: Supreme Court Decisions that Paved the Way
for Attea
The Supreme Court cases leading up to Attea did little to provide any
concrete answers on how courts should solve the dilemma between states and
Indian nations over state taxation of tobacco sales made to non-Indians on
reservation land. However, in the 1960's, the Supreme Court began to
establish general boundaries on states' taxation authority. In 1965 the
Supreme Court decided Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Commission,202 in which it struck down a two percent tax203 levied on a
trading post company that was federally licensed by the United States
Commissioner of Indian Affairs as a retail trader on part of the Navajo
Reservation. 204 The Court found that the tax was preempted by a federal
regulation, 205 and that by taxing Warren, the state had encroached upon the
federal government's exclusive oversight of Indian trade. 206 Essentially, the
Court in Warren held that in the presence of existing federal regulations, the
state was without any duties or responsibilities on Indian lands, and as such
could not levy a sales tax on a federally licensed trading post that did
business with Navajo members. 207 The Court decided the case on the issues,
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. St. Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
203 Id. at 692 (unanimously reversing a decision by the Arizona Supreme Court
which had upheld the tax).
204M. at 686 (noting Warren's argument that taxing revenue derived from his
federally licensed trade with the Indians was unconstitutional under the Indian Commerce
Clause and thus "inconsistent with the comprehensive congressional plan . . . to regulate
Indian trade and traders and to have Indian tribes on reservations govern themselves.").
205 Id
206 Id. (Indian treaties with the United States "contemplate[d] the Indian territory as
completely separate from that of states", giving the federal government exclusive
dealings with the tribes) (quoting Worchester v. Ga., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.), 515, 566-57
(1832)).
207 Id. at 688, 689 (explaining the history of federal regulation of Indian traders,
Justice Black stated that "[s]uch comprehensive federal regulations of Indian traders has
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however, and thus never reached the more complex question of whether the
state tax was prohibited by the Indian Commerce Clause.208
Five years later, the Supreme Court revisited the question over the limits
of state authority to tax members of Indian nations in McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Commission.209 The specific question before the Court in
McClanahan was whether the state of Arizona could levy a personal income
tax on a Navajo reservation Indian whose income came solely from her work
on the Navajo Nation.210 The Court held that the tax on McClanahan was
impermissible because it was preempted by treaties between the U.S.
government and the Navajo Nation. 211 The state tax was consequently found
by the Court to have impermissibly meddled into an area that was "the
exclusive province of the Federal Government and the Indians
themselves." 212 This reinforced the sentiment in Warren that state
infringement into matters involving Indian commerce would not be
tolerated. 213
Regardless of any similarity to the Court's opinion in Warren, the Court
in McClanahan made clear that its holding was narrow.214 The Court
accordingly did not make any statements about the rights of individual
American Indians as a result of their native ancestry, but rather limited the
scope of its opinion to principles currently found within the framework of
tribal sovereignty.2 15 The McClanahan opinion acknowledged the Court's
continued from that day to this," and that federal legislation and regulation "would seem
in themselves sufficient to show that Congress has taken the business of Indian trading on
reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws imposing additional
burdens upon traders.") (citing Act of July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137).
208 380 U.S. 685, 686; see also id. at 690 (explaining that in making their decision,
the Supreme Court considered the unique history of the Navajo Reservation, noting that
the Navajo had been operating their affairs without state interference, "which has
automatically relieved Arizona of all burdens of carrying on in those same
responsibilities.").
209 McClanahan v. Ariz. St. Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
210 Id.
211 Id. at 173. See also id. at 175 (following the interpretation in Warren of a Treaty
between the U.S. and the Navajo Nation which read the Treaty "to preclude extension of
state law-including state tax law-to Indians on the Navajo Reservation.).
2 12 Id. at 165.
213 Id. at 175.
214 Id. at 167-68 (noting upfront that the case before the court only involved
reservation Indians who "possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-government," and
that the court was not addressing the issue of non-Indians on reservation land, or Indians
on non-Indian land).
215 411 U.S. 164, 167-68.
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consideration of the evolving doctrine of tribal sovereignty, and the changes
it had endured since Worcester-noting how any "notions of Indian
sovereignty [had] been adjusted to take account of the State's legitimate
interests in regulating the affairs of non-Indians." 216 This statement
foreshadows a shift in jurisprudence by the Court from inherent Indian
sovereignty, to federal pre-emption.217
On the same day the Supreme Court decided the McClanahan case, it
also heard Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones.218 In Mescalero, the question
before the Court was whether the following taxes were permissible: (1) a
New Mexico tax on the gross receipts of a ski resort owned by the Mescalero
Apache tribe, but located and operated on non-reservation land, and (2) a use
tax on ski lifts bought by the Mescalero Apache from out of state for use in
the resort.219 The Court upheld the gross receipts tax,220 finding that by
operating off reservation boundaries, the Mescalero Apache subjected
themselves to "the same nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to
all citizens of the state."221 However, because property tax is prohibited
under the Federal Indian Rights Act, the Court held that New Mexico could
not apply a use tax on the ski lifts. 222 Accordingly, the Court in Mescalero
attempted to stay away from generalizations about inherent Indian
sovereignty, and instead adhered to a federal pre-emption analysis it
supported in McClanahan.223
216 Id at 171.
217 Id. at 172 (noting that "the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption," but
that the principle of Indian sovereignty is still important "because it provides a backdrop
against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read.").
218 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
219 Id at 146-47.
220 Id at 157-58.
221 Id. at 148-49 (noting that "[a]bsent express federal law to the contrary, Indians
going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to non-
discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State.").
222 Id at 158 (stating that the ski lift on the tribe's property and the "use of
permanent improvements upon land is so intimately connected with the use of land itself
that an explicit provision relieving the latter of state tax burdens must be construed to
encompass an exemption for the former.").
223 See id. at 148 (noting that "[g]eneralizations on this subject have become
particularly treacherous."). See also id. (reiterating the Court's opinion in McClanahan,
that "in the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal
statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian
reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the
reservation . . . .").
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In Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation,224 the Supreme Court departs from the McClanahan225 and
Mescalero226 tradition of looking for guidance in the principle of inherent
Indian sovereignty.227 In Moe, the Court upheld a ruling by the U.S. District
Court for the District of Montana that found it permissible for states to
impose taxes on the non-Indian purchaser of cigarettes bought on Indian
land. 228 Accordingly, the Court found that states may "require a precollection
of the tax imposed by law upon the non-Indian purchaser of the
cigarettes." 229
The Court's analysis focused on the state's interest collecting a lawful
tax, and the nature of the competitive advantage enjoyed by Indian sellers
operating on Indian reservations. 230 Specifically, the Court found that
because it is unlawful for state citizens to not pay the tobacco tax, "the
competitive advantage which the Indian seller doing business on tribal land
enjoys over all other cigarette retailers, within and without the reservation, is
dependent on the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser is willing to flout
his legal obligation to pay the tax."231 Further, the Court found that
Montana's taxation scheme did not frustrate self-government by Indian
nations, nor did it "run afoul of any congressional enactment dealing with the
affairs of reservation Indians." 232 Moe thus appears to have set a precedent
224 Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425
U.S. 463 (1976) (concerning the case of Joseph Wheeler, a member of the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai tribes and operator of a retail tobacco store located on reservation
land, who was arrested along with his Indian employees and charged with the
misdemeanors of selling non-tax-stamped cigarettes, and operating while failing to
possess a valid cigarette retailer licenses).
225 McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
226 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
227 425 U.S. at 466-69 (detailing the history of the Flathead Reservation and the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes in Montana, Justice Rehnquist mentions relevant
federal treaties and statutes, but leaves out the principle of tribal sovereignty guiding the
Court's jurisprudence in McClanahan and Mescalero).
228 Id. at 483.
229 Id. at 468.
230 Id. at 481.
231 Id at 482.
.232 Id. at 483. See id. (finding that Montana may require "the Indian tribal seller [to]
collect a tax validly imposed on non-Indians" because it is a "minimal burden designed to
avoid the likelihood that in its absence non-Indians purchasing from the tribal seller will
avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax."); id. at 482 (distinguishing this case from
Warren, in that that the tax at issue in Warren was a gross income tax imposed directly
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elusively permitting states to require Indian nations to collect a tobacco tax
against non-Indian consumers; however, to what extent a state may burden
an Indian nation for this purpose, and what this says about Indian
sovereignty, still remains unclear.
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,233 the
Supreme Court attempted to clarify its holding in Moe by reducing Moe to
three core principles, and then upholding each of them: First, the Court held
that "states may sometimes impose a nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian
customers of Indian retailers doing business on the reservation." 234 Second,
the Court found that requiring Indian retailers to collect a tax from non-
Indian purchasers on Indian land "may be valid even if it seriously
disadvantages or eliminates the Indian retailer's business with non-
Indians." 235 Finally, the Court found that states "may impose at least
'minimal' burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing the tax." 236
The Court declared the right of Indian tribes to impose their own taxes
on cigarettes to be a "fundamental attribute of Indian sovereignty," 237 which
"is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the
states." 238 Yet, in the same opinion, the Court qualified its statement by
declaring that "[t]he principle of tribal self-government, grounded in notions
of inherent sovereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an
accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the Federal
Government on one hand, and those of the State, on the other."239
Accordingly, when the Court applied the three principles outlined in Moe, it
attempted to balance Washington's state interests with the interests of the
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation. 240
Under the Colville balancing test, the interests of Indian nations are the
strongest when the tax being levied is "derived from value generated on the
reservation by activities involving Tribes, and when the taxpayer is the
recipient of Tribal services." 241 Conversely, the state's interest is the
upon the Indian seller, whereas in the case at hand, the tax burden is on the non-Indian
purchaser.).
233 Wash. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
234 Id. at 151.
235 Id
236 Id
237 Id. at 152.
238 Id
239 Wash. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 156
(1980).
240 Id. at 156-57.
241 Id
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strongest when "the tax is directed at off-reservation value, and when the
taxpayer is the recipient of state services." 242 In Colville, the State of
Washington was found to have an especially strong interest because the tax
was being applied to non-Indians who were not the beneficiaries of tribal
services. 243 Thus, while the Colville Court clarified the principles in Moe
without departing from Moe's reasoning, 244 the Court's use of a balancing
test suggested the Court would look at the issue of state taxation of Indian
tobacco sales to non-Indians on Indian land on a case by case basis.
Eleven years later, the Supreme Court affirmed its conclusions from Moe
and Colville in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma245 when it held that states may tax on-reservation
cigarette sales to non-Indians. 246 However, unwilling "to modify the long-
established principle of sovereign immunity," 247 the Court held that states
were barred from suing Indian tribes to enforce its taxes, 248 even though it
found that the principle of sovereign immunity "does not excuse a tribe from
all obligations to assist in the collection of validly imposed state sales
taxes."249
Thus, in the cases leading up to Attea, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
established a precedent whereby states have the authority to tax Indian
tobacco sales to non-Indians on Indian land, but where states are barred by
the principle of sovereign immunity from suing incompliant Indian nations to
enforce its tax.
242 Id. at 157.
243 Id. See id at 162 (finding Washington's interest to be so strong that the state was
justified in seizing unstamped cigarettes being transported to an Indian reservation to be
sold so long as the cigarettes were seized outside the reservation "where state power over
Indian affairs is considerably more expansive than it is within reservation boundaries.").
244 See id at 159 (noting that the State of Washington's tax collection burden was
"legally indistinguishable" from Montana's tax in Moe).
245 Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505 (1991).
246 Id. at 507.
247 Id. at 510 (rejecting Chief Justice Marshall's argument in Cherokee Nation that
Indian tribes are domestic dependent nations whose sovereign immunity "impermissibly
burdens the administration of state tax laws" and should accordingly be restricted to the
"internal affairs of the tribe.").
248 Id. (writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that "under the
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, the State may not tax such sales to Indians, but
remains free to collect taxes on sales to nonmembers of the tribe.").
249 Id. at 512 (citing Wash. v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980)).
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2. New York's Tobacco Tax Scheme and Seneca Defiance: Attea in
State Court
In the wake of Moe, New York was busy creating new tobacco tax
scheme. 250 In 1998, the New York Department of Taxation and Finance
created regulations that limited the quantity of unstamped cigarettes
wholesalers could sell to Indian nations and Indian retailers. 251 Under its
1988 regulations, the quantity of unstamped cigarettes allotted for sale by
wholesalers to Indian nations and retailers depended upon the Indian nation's
"probable demand." 252
The validity of New York's new taxing scheme was immediately
challenged by Milhelm Attea Bros., Inc. 253 -a non-Indian operated cigarette
wholesaler business that made much of its profits from sales to Indian
nations.254 Relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Warren, Attea
argued that New York's taxation scheme was preempted by federal statutes
controlling Indian trade.255 In particular, Attea pointed to 25 U.S.C. § 261
(2006) in which the FBI could authorize wholesalers to sell cigarettes to
Indians on reservations.256 The New York Appellate Division initially came
down on the side of the wholesalers-however, in the aftermath of its
decision in Potawatomi,257 the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
remanded its decision.258 During its second appearance before the New York
Appellate Division, the court held that 25 U.S.C. § 261 did not preempt the
New York's tobacco taxation scheme, and that accordingly the scheme was
constitutional. 259 The Appellate Division distinguished Attea from Moe and
Colville in that New York's tax regulations only applied to sales made by
non-Indian wholesalers. 260
250 See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Gould, 930 N.E.2d. 233, 235 (N.Y. 2010).
251 See id. at 235.
252 See id.
253 Dep't of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61
(1994).
254 See Cayuga, 930 N.E.2d. at 235-36.
255 512 U.S. at 67-68.
256 25 U.S.C. § 161 (2006). See Attea, 512 U.S. at 68.
257 Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
258 Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. v. Dep't of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y., 585 N.Y.S.2d
847, 849 (App. Div. 1992), rev'd, 615 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1993), rev'd 502 U.S. 1053
(1992).
259 615 N.E.2d at 994.
260 Dep't of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., INC., 512 U.S. 61,
68 (1994).
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Seneca protestors quickly flocked to the New York State Thruway,
blocking any outside traffic from passing through Seneca lands.261 The
protest quickly escalated as some members of the Seneca Nation began
lighting tires on fire and throwing debris.262 A violent confrontation between
Seneca Indians and New York State troopers erupted, injuring people on both
sides of the protest.263 The protests finally came to an end after the New
York Court of Appeals issued an injunction on the enforcement of the tax
scheme. 264 It was not long before Attea found itself before the Supreme
Court.265
3. The Supreme Court's Decision in Attea
Not long after the creation of tax regulations by the New York Taxation
Department, the department "determined that a large volume of unstamped
cigarettes was being purchased by non-Indians from reservation retailers." 266
To prevent this form of tax evasion, the "regulations limit[ed] the quantity of
untaxed cigarettes that wholesalers may sell to tribes and tribal retailers." 267
The regulations also provided that absent any agreement between the Indian
nation and the state, "the Department itself [will limit] the determined
quantity of untaxed cigarettes based on the 'probable demand' of tax-exempt
Indian consumers." 268
Thus, the question before the Supreme Court in Attea was "[w]hether
New York's regulations were pre-empted by federal statutes governing trade
261 Robert Odawi Porter, Tribal Disobedience, 11 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 137, 158
(2006) [hereinafter Tribal Disobedience].
262 Senecas Clash, supra note 7. See also Tribal Disobedience, supra note 262 at
159.
263 Tribal Disobedience, supra note 262, at 159.
264 James Dao, Ruling Scuttles Plan To Collect Taxes on Reservation Sales, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jun. 11, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/1 1/nyregion/ruling-scuttles-plan-
to-collect-taxes-on-reservation-sales.html?scp=8&sq=%22attea%22&st-nyt.
265 See 512 U.S. at 61.
266 Id. at 64-65.
267 Id. at 65.
268 Id. at 66. (detailing that the Department would calculate "probable demand" by
relying on evidence produced by the Indian nations, or by its own math, and that "[e]ach
sale of untaxed cigarettes by a wholesaler to a tribe or reservation must be approved by
the Department." Retailers would then be "sent 'Tax Exemption Coupons' entitling them
to their monthly allotment of tax-exempt cigarettes." The Department would also have
the authority to "without approval of deliveries to tribes or retailers and may cancel the
exemption certificates of noncomplying tribes or retailers.").
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with the Indians," in particular, 25 U.S.C. § 261.269 Justice Stevens authored
the opinion, noting upfront that the opinion was only answering a facial
challenge to New York's tobacco tax scheme. 270 Justice Stevens wrote that
the Court was unwilling to extend its holding any further than "the narrower
question whether the New York scheme is inconsistent with [25 U.S.C. §
261]."271 Reiterating the analysis in Moe,272 the Court applied a balancing
test to the state's interest in regulating the activities within its own borders by
its people, and the interest by Indian nations in tribal autonomy.273 After
balancing these competing interests, the Court found that the state's "valid
interest in ensuring compliance with lawful taxes . . . leaves more room for
state regulation than in others." The Court relied on prior precedent in
"decid[ing] that States may impose on reservation retailers minimal burdens
reasonably tailored to the collection of valid taxes from non-Indians."
According to the Court, it followed that "[25 U.S.C. § 261 does] not bar the
States from imposing reasonable regulatory burdens upon Indian traders . . .
who are not wholly immune from state regulation that is reasonably
necessary to the assessment or collection of lawful state taxes." 274
The Supreme Court's decision in Attea did not determine whether the
mechanisms used in the New York tax scheme are always constitutionally
269 Id. at 64.
270 Id. at 69 (limiting the scope of the Court's opinion required the court to make the
following assumptions: (1) that "the allocations for each reservation will be sufficiently
generous to satisfy the legitimate demands of those reservation Indians who smoke
cigarettes," (2) that the Court's decision would be confined "to those alleged defects that
inhere in the regulations as written," and (3) that while the adverse effects of New York's
scheme "may be relevant. . . this case does not require [the Court] to assess for all
purposes each feature of New York's tax enforcement scheme that might affect tribal
self-government or federal authority over Indian affairs.").
271 512 U.S. at 70.
272 Id. at 64 (reiterating the Court's holding in Moe by stating that "because New
York lacks authority to cigarettes sold to tribal members for their own consumption,
cigarettes to be consumed on the reservation by enrolled tribal members are tax exempt
and need not be stamped."). But see, id. at 71 (noting that cases like Moe limited the
language in Warren which most likely would have found 25 U.S.C. § 286 to preempt
state interference.); id. (reiterating its findings in Colville that "the Tribes had failed to
meet their burden of showing that the record keeping requirements . . . were "not
reasonably necessary as a means of preventing fraudulent transactions," which the state
had a valid interest in preventing.).
273 Id. at 72 (noting that "this is a conflict whose resolution does not depend on
ridged concepts but instead on a particularized inquiry into the facts.").
274 Id. at 74-75.
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permissible.275 Rather, the Court acknowledged the possibility of future
problems while encouraging the State Taxation Department and individual
Indian nations to "address or resolve problems that are now purely
hypothetical." 276 Yet while Supreme Court handed down another opinion
specifically tailored to the facts before it, New York hailed the Supreme
Court's ruling Attea as a major victory for the state.277 This victory, however,
would be short-lived.
4. The Aftermath of Attea
While New York saw great promise for resolution immediately
following Attea,278 conflict and confusion quickly resumed. After Attea, the
department declared it was going to begin its enforcement of tax collection as
soon as it "finalize[d] the plan's technical details." 279 However, multiple
delays arose, 280 and all negotiations between the department and New York's
Indian nations failed.281
When the department finally announced its plan late February 1996 to
begin enforcement of its tax scheme on Indian nations starting July 5th,282
Indian nation leaders vowed to fight the enforcement. 283 Approaching the
275 Id. at 76 (admitting that future problems may arise with the application of the
New York tax scheme and that problems such as "unduly burdensome" procedure
"absent wrongful withholding or delay of approval ... can be addressed if and when they
arise").
276 See id. at 77-78.
277 See e.g., Linda Greenhouse, New York Sees Tax Windfall in Indian Sales, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1004/06/14/nyregion/new-york-sees-tax-
winfall-in-indian-sales.html?scp=1 1 &sq=%22attea%22&st-nyt.
278 See id.
279 See N.Y. Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Urbach, 699 N.E.2d 904, 908 (N.Y.
1998) (holding that New York's forbearance policy did not constitute a racial
classification subject to strict scrutiny against non-Indian convenience store owners);
Michel P. Cassier & Andrew B. Sabol, State Taxation, 49 SYRACUSE L. REv. 729, 766
(1999) (noting that the implementation of the Department's proposed regulations was
postponed until an opinion was issued in Urbach).
280 See Cassier & Sabol, supra note 279.
281 See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Gould, 930 N.E.2d 233, 237 (N.Y. 2010)
(mentioning the failed negotiations between New York and its Indian nations).
282 Jon R. Sorensen, State to Collect Levies on Reservation-Bound Cigarettes, Gas,
BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 25, 1996, hittp://highbeam.com/doc/I P2-22836598.html.
283 Susan Schulman, Leaders Vow to Fight Proposal Tax on Gasoline, Cigarettes,
BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 25, 1996, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/IP2022837345.html
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July 5th deadline, hundreds of American Indian protesters flocked to the
New York State capitol in Albany, prompting Governor George Pataki to lift
the July enforcement date.284 After another round of tepid negotiations ended
up in a stalemate, 285 Pataki announced an interim compromise in which
Indian nations would apply their own taxes on non-Indian tobacco sales at a
rate lower than that of the state. 286 While four of New York's Indian nations
agreed to the Governor's offer,287 the four other Indian nations-including
the Seneca Nation-who represented the largest shares of on-reservation
tobacco sales, declined.288 The department responded by ordering
wholesalers to cease all shipments of tobacco products to the declining
Indian nations, 289 which resulted in a repeat of the 1992 blockade of the New
York State Thruway.290
The Governor and the Department responded by continuing to practice a
policy of forbearance. 291 However, in 2003 the New York State legislature
adopted Tax Law 471-e, ordering the department to adopt regulations on the
taxation of non-Indian tobacco sales to non-Indians on reservations.292 The
department responded to the legislature's request by drafting regulations, but
never moved to adopt them.293 Lacking department action, forbearance
ensued.294
(reporting on a summit attended by over 200 Indian leaders and officials vowing to fight
New York's enforcement efforts).
284 Karen L. Folster, Comment, Just Cheap Butts, or an Equal Protection
Violation?: New York's Failure to Tax Reservation Sales to Non-Indians, 62 ALB. L.
REV. 697, 705 (1998).
285 Id. at 706.
286 Id
287 Id at n.82 (noting that the Onondaga, Oneida, Tuscarora, and Cayuga Nations all
agreed to Governor Pataki's interim compromise).
288 Raymond Hernandez, In a Shift, New York Won't Try to Tax sales on Indian
Lands, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/22/nyregion/in-a-
shift-new-york-won-t-try-to-tax-sales-on-indian-lands.html.
289 Folster, supra note 285, at 707.
290 William Glaberson, Trying To Unite Fractured Tribe While Fighting State over
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1997, http://bytimes.com/1997/04/22/nyregion/trying-to-
unite-fractured-tribe-while-fighting-state-over-taxes.html?scp=1&sq-seneca&st-nyt.
291 Hernandez, supra note 289 (reporting that on May 22, 1997, Governor Pataki
officially announced that the State would end its enforcement of the Department's tax
scheme, and instead would practice a policy of forbearance).
292 2003 N.Y. Sess. Laws 579 (McKinney).
293 See Cayuga, 930 N.E.2d at 238.
294 See id
814
[Vol. 28:3 2013]
NEGOTIATING PAST SOVEREIGNTY POSITIONS
In 2005, the State legislature responded to the department's lack of
action with an amendment to 471-e which incorporated of the department's
2003 proposed regulations. 295 Tax Law 471-e now provided that "non-
Indians making cigarette purchases on an Indian reservation shall not be
exempt from paying the cigarette tax when purchasing cigarettes within this
state." 296 The amended tax law was challenged by a tribal retailer in Day
Wholesale, Inc. v. State,297 who initiated an action for declaratory judgment
against state enforcement of the 471-e amendments. 298 Finding the 471-e
amendments to have provided insurance of Indian tax exemption coupons,
the Appellate Division enjoined the enforcement of 471-e. 299
This was the environment within which the New York Court of Appeals
decided Cayuga Indian Nation ofNew York v. Gould in 2010.300 But in light
of the Appellate Division's upholding of the Tax law 471-e amendments, the
Court of Appeals in Cayuga held that there was "no enforceable statutory or
regulatory scheme specifically addressing the calculation and collection of
taxes arising from the on-reservation sale of cigarettes." 301 "In absence of a
methodology developed by the state that respects the federally protected right
to sell untaxed cigarettes to members of the Nation while at the same time
providing for the calculation and collection of the tax relating to retail sales
to non-Indian consumers," 302 the Court of Appeals held that taxes could not
be collected on reservation sales to non-Indians. 303 However, the Court of
Appeals urged New York to create a "specialized mechanism" to calculate
taxation rates for Indian nations while at the same time remaining sensitive to
the needs of its Indian nations.304
295 See 2005 N.Y. Sess. Laws 461.
296 Id. (adopting a "probable demand mechanism and a coupon system mirroring the
1988 regulations"). See Cayuga, 930 N.E.2d at 239 (noting that in 471-e the Department
does not say how probable demand is to be calculated, or what rules are required for the
regulations proper implementation and enforcement).
297 Day Wholesale, Inc. v. State, 856 N.Y.S.2d 808, 808 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
298 856 N.Y.S.2d. at 808.
299 Id. at 810 (concluding that such provisions are effective only when "[alt
minimum, the actions, rules and regulations necessary for the implementation of the
statutory scheme include the issuance of Indian tax exemption coupons).
300 Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Gould, 930 N.E.2d 233, 239-49 (N.Y.
2010).
301 Id. at 239-40.
302 Id at 253.
303 Id
304 See id. at 254.
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Yet, while the Supreme Court was deciding Cayuga, the department
revoked its policy of forbearance, 305 and the New York State legislature
successfully enacted amendments to Tax Law 471-e, which included the
required provisions and a tax exemption coupon system. 30 6 On June 22,
2010, the department adopted an emergency rule to enforce these
amendments. 30 7 The department also moved to lift the preliminary injunction
in place from the 2008 Day Wholesale308 litigation, arguing that their new
system satisfied all of the requirements set forth in Cayuga.309 The district
court denied the department's motion due to the "irreparable injury absent a
stay" that would be inflicted upon New York's Indian nations, and which
could "not be remedied by damages." 31 0 On December 9, 2010, the Second
Circuit denied the State's motion to lift the district court's stay.
IV. NEGOTIATING AROUND THE ZERO-SUM: FOCUSING ON
DISCOVERING INTERESTS UNDERLYING BOTH PARTIES' UNYIELDING
SOVEREIGNTY POSITIONS
Throughout the history of the United States, interactions between the
federal government, states, and Indian nations have provided the American
legal system with a working definition of "Indian sovereignty." 3 11
305 Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Application for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Plaintiffs' Motion for a Summary Judgment at 10 (statement of Peter Day,
President of Day Wholesale, Inc.), Day Wholesale Inc. et al. v. Seneca Nation of Indians,
2006 WL 6627285 (N.Y.Sup.).
306 Id. at 11.
307 Id.
308 See Dan Herbeck & Aaron Besecker, State Relents After Ruling on Cigarette
Tax, BUFFALO NEWS, Sept. 2, 2010, http://www.buffalonews.com/city/articlel78397.ece.
309 See Affidavit in Support of Applicants' Application for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Summary Judgment, supra note 306, at 12.
310 Seneca Nation of Indians v. Paterson, No. 10-CV-687A (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 14,
2010), available at http://docsjustia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-
york/nywdce/1:2010cv00687/804, at 4-5 (finding that "[a]proximately 3,000 people are
currently employed by the Seneca Nation's 172 tobacco retailers," and that "[t]he
potential loss of an entire economy that currently supports many of each Nation's
members and services is a harm that cannot be measured in monetary damage alone.");
id. at 6 (noting New York's "dramatic shift" from practicing a policy forbearance to
aggressive enforcement, and stating that "the Court does not believe that the minimum
additional delay pending appeal will cause substantial injury [to the state], particularly
when weighed against the potential irreparable harm to the Nations' tobacco
economies.").
311 Supra Sections II and III.
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Accordingly, the federal government, states, and even some Indian nations,
have looked to the meaning of Indian sovereignty in American jurisprudence
in its efforts to define legal boundaries in the tobacco tax dispute.312
However, these efforts-which essentially ask the court to pick the "correct"
interpretation of "Indian sovereignty" from two competing versions which
both claim to be properly rooted in American jurisprudence-are not
working for the State of New York and the Seneca Nation. Instead, the
process has failed to produce any resolution in the longstanding tobacco tax
conflict between the two parties.
A zero-sum litigation process is likely to blame for the stalemate. The
current process threatens the positions and interests of both parties in
preserving sovereignty. At the same time, the current process unfortunately
overlooks the potential of overlapping interests to further create options for
mutual benefit. In response to the past legislative and litigious failures to
resolve the dispute, Section IV proposes an alternative process whereby both
parties engage in good-faith negotiations over party interests independent of
their positions on each other's respective sovereignty. In this imagined
alternative, both parties are free to consider their dynamic-and arguably
more flexible-interests independent of their uncompromising positions on
sovereignty.
A. The Current Dispute Resolution Model and its Alternatives
In light of the Supreme Court's finding in Attea that the State of New
York can lawfully tax Seneca tobacco sales to non-members, 313 the Seneca
312 Supra Sections II and III.
313 Dep't of Taxation and Fin. of N.Y. v. Milheim Attea & Bros., Inc., 512 U.S. 61,
61 (1994); see James Fink, Tobacco Tax Ruling Fails to Deter Seneca Nation, THE BUFF.
L.J., Jun. 23, 2011,
http://www.1awjoumalbuffalo.com/news/article/current/2011/06/23/103225/tobacco-tax-
ruling-fails-to-deter-seneca-nation (noting how in response to the Supreme Court's 2011
ruling in Attea, Robert Odawi Porter, President of the Seneca Nation, vowed that New
York would "never collect a cent of revenue from tobacco sales occurring in [Seneca]
territories," and that any future revenue predictions trying to indicate otherwise were
"foolishness."). See also David Caruso, Seneca Tobacco Accused of Flouting Law, THE
BUFF. L.J., Jun. 28, 2012,
http://www.lawjoumalbuffalo.com/news/article/current/2012/06/28/ (describing how in
one instance, the state New York filed a federal lawsuit against two members of the
Seneca Nation who during a sting operation, were found to have sold cigarettes online
without taxing the buyer, verifying the age of the individual receiving the order, or
attaching the required surgeon general's health warnings to the products.).
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Nation continues to resist paying or collecting any tax on its tobacco sales. 314
In June of 2012, New York demonstrated its own resistance to a legal
decision when it refused to comply with a court order from a New York State
Supreme Court Judge mandating the State release a shipment of unstamped
native brand tobacco products it seized from an Indian nation carrier. 315 This
lack of compliance is not surprising when one considers the lack of
legitimacy from which the current process suffers.
Under the current process, the New York State Congress enacts a statue,
or the appropriate department (i.e. Department of Taxation and Finance)
passes a regulation, which defines and/or requires some form of taxation for
Indian tobacco sales made on a reservation to non-members. As a way to
gain cooperation, the statute or regulation will mandate "lawful compliance"
by all citizens-including members of Indian nations within its borders. 316
Despite this official language, precedent suggests members of the Seneca
Nation will unlikely comply-claiming instead that the statute violates their
314 See Caruso, supra note 314 (reporting how, in light of New York's lawsuit,
Seneca business owners have maintained the position that they did nothing wrong, and
that as Seneca members they are exempt from state taxation on tobacco sales). See also
Fink, supra note 314 (noting how Seneca businesses have tried to bypass the Supreme
Court's ruling in Attea by refusing to selling premium brand cigarettes. Instead, many
Seneca retailers have stated selling only Seneca and other "Traditional" or "Native,"
brands which they say cannot be taxed even under Attea.).
315 See Gale Courey Toensing, Judge: State has 'No Legal Authority' to Seize
Untaxed Indian Cigarettes in Out-of-State Sales, INDIAN COUNTY TODAY, June 22, 2012,
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/article/judge%3A-state-has-
%E2%80%98no-legal-authority%E2%80%99-to-seize-untaxed-indian-cigarettes-in-out-
of-state-sales-I 19936, [hereinafter State has 'No Legal Authority I (reporting that on
January 23, 2011, New York Border Patrol officers pulled over truck driven by a member
of the Mohawk Nation, and without a warrant broke open the seal on the trucks cargo
doors and seized 26,160 cartons of cigarettes owned by the Winnebago tribe of Nebraska,
as well as seventy-two bags of loose tobacco that had been purchased from a federally
licensed manufacturer on another Indian nation. A New York Supreme Court Judge ruled
on June 18, 2012 that New York had no legal authority to seize or hold the untaxed
cigarettes because they were "manufactured on Indian land and being sold to an out-of-
state reservation," and that New York state police were to immediately return all seized
property-which was valued at over two million dollars); see also Gale Courey
Toensing, New York State Holds Seized Cigarettes in Defiance of Court Order, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY, July 3, 2012,
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/mobile/article/new-york-state-holds-seized-
cigarettes-in-defiance-of-court-order-122006, [hereinafter New York State Holds Seized
Cigarettes] (noting that as of July 2012, New York and the Cuomo administration
remained defiant of the court order, refused to return the seized cargo, and declared that
they would "not change their enforcement practices despite the court ruling.").
316 NY TAX LAW § 471 (McKinney).
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sovereign immunity against state taxation.317 But what the Seneca Nation
claims to be a lawful assertion of their "sovereign immunity," New York will
fill find to be a "circumvention of a lawful tax." 318
Under this process, one of two events is likely to occur next: (1) New
York may respond to the "tax evasion" by filing a complaint against the
noncompliant Seneca members, 319 or (2) Members of the Seneca Nation may
file for an injunction against the state to cease attempts by the state to collect
the tax. 320 If either compliant is valid the parties will proceed to court. At
court, the "winning party"-i.e. the party whose interpretation of their own
sovereign capacities is most closely aligned with the court's decision-will
lack an incentive to illegitimate the process, and accordingly will comply
with the court's orders. 321 However, the winning argument will have relied
on a definition of sovereignty that runs afoul of the losing party's beliefs
concerning their own sovereignty. Accordingly, absent a willingness to cede
sovereignty to the winning party, the losing party is likely label the process
illegitimate, and their willingness to comply with the outcome becomes
unlikely.322
317 Testimony of Robert Odawi Porter President of the Seneca Nation of Indians
before the Comm. On Fin. U.S. S. Hearing on Tax Reform: What it Could Mean for
Tribes and Territories, 112th Cong. 2 (2012) [hereinafter Testimony of Robert Odawi
Porter] (statement of Robert Odawi Porter, President of the Seneca Nation of Indians).
318 See Tom Precious & Dan Herbeck, State Sets to get Tax on Indian Cigarette
Sales, BUFFALO NEWS, May 9, 2011, http://www.buffalonews.com/city/police-
courts/courts/article417925.ece (quoting Governor Andrew Cuomo: "[T]axes on
cigarettes sold to nontribal members must be collected because this is revenue rightly
owed to the state, and with this decision, my administration will move to do so
expeditiously.").
319 See e.g., Gale Courey Toensing, Does the Shadow of Big Tobacco Loom Behind
the Recent Seizure of Mohawk Cigarettes? INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, June 1, 2012.
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/mobile/article/does-the-shadow-of-big-
tobacco-loom-behind-the-recent-seizure-of-mohawk-cigarettes%3F- 115960.
320 See Amended Verified Complaint Seneca Nation of Indians v. The State of New
York, et al., 2011 WL 6951219 (N.Y. Sup.).
321 See Executive Refusal: Why the State Has Failed to Collect Cigarette Taxes on
Native American Reservations, 233 Sess. 4 (N.Y. 2010) [hereinafter Executive Refusal]
available at
http://www.nysenate.gov/files/pdfs/Executive%2ORefusal%2OFINAL%20june%20201O.p
df (citing Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc. 512 U.S. at 73-78 which upheld New York's state
tax exemption coupon system. He justified the legitimacy of the State's coupon system
on Indian reservations by noting that "[T]he Supreme Court and other federal courts have
upheld efforts by various states to enforce various taxing mechanisms.").
322 See Susan Asquith & Sharon Linstedt, Seneca Nation Response to New York
State Senate Committee Call Sales tax collection on Sales of Native American Tobacco
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Instead, the "losing party" cites its original position as justification for
why the court's opinion or court order does not apply to them.323 The "losing
party" must wait until another litigation cycle is initiated in hopes that the
court order or opinion will "properly" reflect their position. Only then will
the court's opinion be legitimate and its orders binding to them.
Consequently, the status quo is left intact until one party either decides to
give in to the other's demands and forfeit their position-which is highly
unlikely-or until one party decides to use violence against the other to force
compliance-which is highly undesirable.
While most of the dispute over unilateral state taxation legislation and
Seneca Nation noncompliance has been addressed using this litigation
process, litigation is not the only method of dispute resolution the parties
have utilized. Both parties have previously experimented with alternatives-
such as the use of force, practicing forbearance, and attempting some form of
negotiation. Each of these alternatives is discussed below to highlight the
possible benefits and challenges they might bring to the dispute resolution
process. Out of these alternatives, negotiation is introduced as having the
potential capacity to bring about mutually-beneficial resolution for the
parties, while at the same time preserving their respective positions on
sovereignty.
Both parties have the option of using violence or another disruptive act to
force or compel the other party to retreat from their initial position and
comply with their demands. The Seneca Nation used this tactic twice before
when it barricaded the New York State Thruway in 1992 and in 1997.324
Both times were in response to New York efforts to collect a state tobacco
tax.325 New York officials characterized the events as "violent confrontations
on reservation lands [which resulted] in serious personal injury, major
Products, PR NEWSWIRE (June I1, 2010),
http://www.bizjournals.com/pmewswire/press-release/2010/06/11/2012 (quoting Seneca
Tribal Council Chair Richard Nephew, in his response to Sen. Johnson's Executive
Refusal: "It comes down to lawmakers spending a lot of time and money to say once
again that the state is in desperate need of new revenue sources and we are targeted as a
source. There's nothing new there. We continue to agree to disagree[.] . . . On our side,
treaty rights remain as strong as ever and we remain a sovereign nation.").
323 See id. at 1 (citing Richard Nephew's belief that in authoring Executive Refusal,
supra note 321, Sen. Johnson "cite[d] self-serving legal precedent to justify having an
subservient government collect taxes."). See also Asquith & Linstedt, supra note 322
(reporting that Nephew's response to the publication of Executive Refusal also expressed
frustration with the Chairman to the Standing Committee's recommendation that the state
enforce the upheld taxes because doing so would "usurp federal treaty rights").
324 See Lisberg et al., supra note 4. See also Senecas Clash, supra note 7.
325 See Lisberg et al., supra note 4. See also Senecas Clash, supra note 7.
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disruptions and threats to public safety."326 In the wake of the State Thruway
incidents, barricade efforts by Seneca Nation members were credited with
prompting the suspension of all state tax collection efforts.327
There is also always the threat that the Seneca Nation may resort to
violence should it become necessary to protect its tobacco economy. 328 This
threat was acknowledged by New York officials on September 23, 2009
when former Governor Paterson wrote to the United States Attorneys for the
Eastern, Northern and Western Districts of New York to inquire about the
possibility and extent of possible violence in the event that tax collection was
initiated. 329 While no formal response was given, the Governor was
informally advised that tax enforcement at that time would re-ignite violence
and carry a heavy financial burden.330 Accordingly, the State Thruway
incidents appear fresh in the memory of New York politicians and
representatives who may remain hesitant about sparking future violence.
Both parties also have the option to ignore the dispute and try to maintain
the status quo. Considering the benefits of forbearance to both parties, it is
not surprising that they have chosen this route before. For the Seneca Nation,
forbearance provides one incredibly attractive benefit-it keeps the Nation
and its members out of court. Past litigation established unfavorable
precedent challenging the Treaty of Canandaigua's language on sovereign
exemption. 331 As a result, initiating litigation would be incredibly risky for
326 See Executive Refusal, supra note 321, at 10.
327 See id. (finding New York's suspension of tax collection efforts to have resulted
in forbearance).
328 See New York Holds Seized Cigarettes, supra note 315, at 2 (reporting on the
Seneca Nation Council chair Richard Nephew's response to New York's seizure of
Native brand tobacco products).
329 See id. at 10.
330 See Executive Refusal, supra note 321, at 10. (citing the testimony of Peter J.
Kiernan, Esq, from Oct. 27, 2010, in which Kieman noted that the Governor had been
informally advised that all threat assessments conducted by Justice Department would be
deferred to State Police. Some estimates made by the New York State Police found daily
enforcement costs during the State Thruway conflict to be around $2 million a day.).
331 Executive Refusal, supra note 321, at 6 (citing to the finding in Snyder v.
Wetzler, 193 A.D.2d 329 (3rd Dept 1993), affd, 84 N.Y.2d 941 (1994) that the Buffalo
Creek Treaty "may not be utilized as a basis to preclude sales tax liability or collection.").
See id. at fn. 26 (citing Briffault's Testimony from Jan. 26, 2010 that "[t]he treaty was
plainly intended to prevent recurrence of assessments on land, but it says nothing about
and has no bearing on a sales tax which is not a tax on land"). See also N.Y. St. Dept. of
Taxation & Fin. v. Bramlhall, 235 A.D.2d 75, 85 (4th Dep't 1997) (finding the Buffalo
Creek Treaty "prohibits the State from taxing reservation land" but "does not bar the
imposition of excise and sales tax on cigarettes . . . sold to non-Indians on the Seneca
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the Seneca Nation, and would not be entered into lightly. Forbearance
policies also provide the State of New York the benefit of avoiding violence
and civil unrest.332 They may also help New York avoid expensive litigation
with several of its Indian nations who tend to ally with the Seneca Nation
over matters involving the production and sale of Indian tobacco products.
However, despite the benefits of forbearance to both parties, its
undesirable long-term legal and economic challenges-especially for the
State of New York333-have made its benefits short-lived. 334 In the 1990's,
the State of New York practiced a policy of forbearance which resulted in
judicial recognition by New York state courts of the discretion possessed by
the state executive branch to refrain from collecting sales and use taxes on
reservation sales to non-Indians. 335 Consequently, the distribution of tax
exemption coupons to Indian nations as part of New York's tobacco tax
policy became dependent upon the receipt of permission from the Governor
of the State of New York.336 Not only did this place an enormous amount of
pressure on the Governor, it also highly politicized the issue because the
enforcement of tobacco taxation on Indian lands became something that
changed with each gubernatorial election. 337 With each tax free purchase of
reservations"); U.S. v. Kaid, 241 F.App'x 747, 750 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding that the
Buffalo Creek Treaty "clearly prohibit[s] only the taxation of real property, not chattels
like cigarettes").
332 See Executive Refusal, supra note 321, at 2 (finding the blockade of the New
York State Thruway by members of the Seneca Nation in which the "State faced threats
and experienced violence during its efforts to collect the tax" to have resulted in New
York's "forbearance policy.").
333 See N.Y. State Convenience Ass'n of Convenience Stores v. Urbach, 92
N.Y.S.2d 204 (1998); see generally Executive Refusal, supra note 321 (arguing that the
forbearance policies were a failure, and that state tax laws should be enforced upon New
York's Indian nations, including the Seneca).
334 See e.g., Executive Refusal, supra note 321, at 9 (arguing that the policy of
forbearance continues today regardless of the Governor's political as a result of New
York's bipartisan failure to enforce state tobacco tax laws on its Indian nations during
and following the 1990's.).
335 See e.g., Day Wholesale, Inc., 856 N.Y.S.2d at 811 (finding that "[in sum ....
the amended version of Tax Law section 471-e cannot become effective absent certain
action, rules and regulations necessary to implement it, and it is undisputed that there
have been no such actions taken or rules and regulations promulgated by the
Department").
336 Executive Refusal, supra note 321, at 10.
337 See, e.g., id., supra note 321, at 8 (Explaining that in 2010 New York estimated
that each tax free purchase of one pack of cigarettes deprives its state coffers of $2.75 in
excise tax, and that in addition to that loss state and local governments lose an additional
fifty cents in tax revenue. The failure of New York governors to collect tobacco taxes
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cigarettes by a non-member of the Seneca Nation depriving New York of a
sizable portion of revenue,338 and with the Seneca Nation being an easy
political scapegoat, a forbearance policy is not a sustainable solution. 339
Alternatively, the State of New York and the Seneca Nation can come to
the bargaining table and negotiate a settlement that works for both parties.
While the idea of negotiating over the tobacco tax dispute is not new,340 a
from its Indian nations is argued to have caused an unacceptable loss of legitimate sales
to licensed New York retailers, resulting in billions of dollars in unclaimed and
community reinvestment revenue.). See also id. (citing the Written Testimony of William
Comiskey who stated that each year New York practices a policy of forbearance the state
loses $200 million in possible tax revenues. ). But see, Testimony of J C. Seneca, at 187
(insisting that New York's estimations on lost revenue due to Indian tax evasion is
"untrue and misleading," and noting that its businesses in western New York pump over
$1.1 billion into the local state economy annually); id. at 249 (citing a study conducted by
Harvard economist Jonathan Taylor whose studies show New York to employ over 3,000
non-Senecas, and that New Yorkers who buy cigarettes ... on Indian reservations spend
their savings in New York, which arguably benefits the state's local economies).
338 See Executive Refusal, supra note 321, at 8 (discussing New York's estimations
of amount of revenue it believes itself to have lost as a result of failure to enforce state
tobacco taxes on its Indian nations).
339 See, e.g., Comments of the Seneca Nation of Indians on the Proposed Interim
Rule to Implement the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of2009 ("PACT Act"), Pub.
L. 111-157, Presented by Richard E. Nephew, Council Chairman and Co-Chair of The
Seneca Nation of Indians Foreign Relations Committee, Before the U.S. Dept. of Justice
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms * Explosives (June 8, 2010), [hereinafter
Comments of the Seneca Nation ofIndians], at 13 (noting that "the sponsors of the PACT
Act and the White House never gave [the Seneca Nation] the opportunity to be respected
as a responsible, self-regulating tribal government"). See also id. (exclaiming that the
Seneca nation "[does] not sell cigarettes to children and [does] not support terrorism," but
rather has "simply developed an economy and provided jobs for [their] people based
upon the sale of a lawful commodity that non-Indians have long profited from"); id. at
13-14 (further stating that "Had [the Seneca Nation] been given the opportunity for
meaningful consultation and negotiation, I am confident we could have found common
ground that would have not required the sacrifice of thousands of jobs and the Nation's
private sector economy.").
340 See Jon R. Sorensen, State to Collect Levies on Reservation-Bound Cigarettes,
Gas, BUFFALO NEWS, (Feb. 21, 1996), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/IP2-
22836598.html (reporting that in February of 1996, the New York State Tax Department
adopted administrative regulations to begin the process of collecting taxes on Indian sales
of tobacco products to non-Indians that it had begun in 1988. At this time, the State Tax
Department gave New York's Indian nations four months to either negotiate plans with
New York to develop a taxation scheme, or to face the involuntary collection of taxes by
New York. The announcement upset state Indian nations, resulting in a Tribal summit
attended by more than 200 Tribal leaders and other Indian officials.). See also Karen L.
Foster, Comment, Just Cheap Butts, or an Equal Protection Violation?: New York's
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legitimate effort to truly negotiate as equals has been absent at the bargaining
table.341 Past attempts "negotiations" have accomplished little more than
both parties placing their already known positions on the table and
conducting the negotiation with a "take it or leave it" attitude-a process
which did not bring about resolution. 342 These failures are often cited as a
justification for litigation.343
Over time, litigation between the State of New York and members of the
Seneca Nation has evolved into a zero-sum game over incompatible positions
in a courtroom. At the same time, actions favoring violence and forbearance
are not sustainable. This note proposes it is time for both parties to once
again sit down at the bargaining table-this time making legitimate efforts to
failure To Tax Reservation Sales to Non-Indians, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 697, 705 (1998) (noting
that following a protest rally planned for May 14, 1996 outside the Capitol building in
Albany, "Governor Pataki lifted the July 5th deadline on the eve of the planned rally and
enlisted the aid of a federal mediator in an attempt to help negotiations between the state
and Native American leaders."); Susan Schulman, Leaders Vow to Fight Proposed Tax
on Gasoline, Cigarettes, BUFFALO NEWS, (Feb. 25, 1996),
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/IP2-22837345.html (explaining the underlying pressures
placed on New York Governor George Pataki to end the July 5, 1996 enforcement
deadline and move towards a forbearance policy that resulted from the Albany Protests);
see also William Glaberson, supra note 290.
341 See Raymond Hemandez, supra note 288 (reporting that the 1997 negotiations
between the Seneca Nations and New York broke down after only two days, and on May 22,
1997, Governor Pataki announced the state's official position that it would end its negotiations
with the Indian nations, and instead officially announced a "permanent forbearance policy").
See also id. (referencing 2003 N.Y. Sess. Laws 579 (McKinney) which was adopted in 2003
following New York's official announcement of forbearance and directed the State Department
of Taxation to adopt regulations to tax tobacco sales to non-Indians on reservations); id. (adding
that in 2005, Tax Law471-e was amended by 2005 N.Y. Sess. Laws 461to include the
statement: "non-Indians making cigarette purchase on an Indian reservation shall not be exempt
from paying the cigarette tax when purchasing cigarettes within the state"); Federal Judge
Deals Blow to Efforts by Senecas to Continue Internet Tobacco Sales, Statement of Matthew L.
Myers, President of Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Jul.30, 2010, available at
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press releases/post/id_1224 (noting that "well before the
PACT Act was signed into law, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and the
U.S. Attorney for the Western District of New York tried repeatedly to negotiate with the
Seneca.").
342 See Testimony of Robert Odawi Porter, supra note 317, at 2 (offering the
following testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance: "[M]any aspects of
our treaty-recognized freedoms have been eroded over time, particularly those that
originally protected our individual tribal citizens. All three branches of government ...
have directly caused or allowed this erosion to occur. Without any express Congressional
authorization, over the last 60 years the Treasury Department has forced tribal citizens to
become taxpayers in violation of our treaty status.").
343 See supra note 341.
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negotiate in good faith by moving past their unyielding positions for which
there is no room at the bargaining table. As in most negotiations, it is likely
that beneath both party's stubborn positions are dynamic interests waiting to
be discovered. These interests can, and should, be considered independent of
negotiations over sovereignty. If both parties make a legitimate effort to act
as equals to negotiate ways to create mutual gain from these hidden interests,
the zero-sum curse may finally come to an end while leaving the sovereignty
of both parties respected and intact.
B. The Evolution of the Zero-Sum Dilemma Between New York and
The Seneca Nation
In its current state, litigation between the State of New York and the
Seneca Nation over tobacco taxes is only capable of producing one "winner"
and one "loser." Because there can only be one winner, movements by each
party towards resolution during the litigation process inevitably takes on an
"all or nothing" dynamic with no room for middle ground. This is the
inevitable zero-sum endgame for a litigated dispute rooted in competing
positions regarding the scope of each sovereign's power relative to the other.
Consequently, the winning party to litigation will view a court opinion either
as legitimizing their sovereign power over the other party to act, or as one
that justifies a sovereign exemption from the other's sovereign authority.
Conversely, the losing party is likely to view the unfavorable ruling as
confirmation of the court's illegitimacy to bind them to an action. With much
of the tobacco tax conflict between the State of New York and the Seneca
Nation rooted in competing positions on sovereign authority which date back
to the beginning of 1700's, 344 it is unlikely a court opinion will change the
losing party's mind.
As a result, the winning party cannot collect on its win, and the losing
party only finds further justification to legitimize its decision to refrain from
344 See Testimony of Robert Odawi Porter, supra note 317 at I (stating that The
Seneca Nation of Indians . . . is one of America's earliest allies . . ., living in peace with
the American people since the signing of the Canandaigua Treaty over 217 years ago on
November 11, 1794."). See also id. at 1-2 (reminding the Committee that the Seneca
Nation has "entered into numerous treaties and agreements with the United States, "and
that the Nation has "always sought to live up to [their] side of this relationship, despite
repeated instances in which the United States has not done so." Seneca further states that
the treaties responsible for Seneca sovereignty have helped secure the Nation's economic
success, and that the Seneca Nation has fought for this success even while "under
constant assault from hostile forces-such as the state of New York and private sector
predators," who Seneca argues "seek to deprive [the Seneca people] of economic
prosperity and return us [them] the poverty of a prior era.").
825
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
compliance. 345 This reality puts both parties in an undesirable situation.
However, if a losing party in a court case complies with the court's ruling
their compliance will be viewed by the winning party as an acquiescence of
sovereignty to the winning party. The potential repercussions of such an act
by the losing party to the litigation cannot be understated. True compliance
by the losing sovereign entity would suggest a willingness to change the
status quo on their sovereignty simply because of court opinion. This would
further suggest a legitimization of a court system that does not share their
views on sovereignty and which consequently threatens it. To date, this
willing acquiescence of sovereign power has never happened-absent an act
of great violence, it likely never will. 346
The likelihood of compliance by either party with an unfavorable court
opinion will be determined by the way in which both the Seneca Nation and
the State of New York define their own legitimacy as a sovereign entity-
both inside and outside the court-as well as their sovereignty relative to the
perceived sovereignty of the other.347 Consequently, securing compliance on
a court order from a party to which it was unfavorable becomes incredibly
difficult. New York and the Seneca Nation, like all other sovereign entities,
are likely to only comply with those rulings it finds legitimate. They may-
but not always-also comply if the threat of violence or harm to their people
in the event of noncompliance becomes greater than the need to maintain
sovereignty. However, what a sovereign governmental entity considers a
legitimate court opinion-meaning that the sovereign entity and their people
would view the opinion as legally binding to them-is dependent upon how
the sovereign entity defines and understands its own legitimacy as a
sovereign power.
The State of New York might accordingly find legitimacy to enact and
enforce certain tobacco taxes on the Seneca Nation in the historical events
which have shaped its definitions of "state sovereignty" and "Indian
345 See Susan Asquith & Sharon Linstedt, supra note 322 (citing Nephew's claims
that "[New York] cites to self-serving legal precedent to justify having a subservient
government collect taxes").
346 See Sharon Linstedt et al., Seneca Nation Leaders, Members Testify at Cigarette
Tax Collection Hearing in Manhattan, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 27, 2009, (quoting J.C.
Seneca: "For over 200 years, New York State has tried to steal our lands, assert
jurisdiction over what lands we have left, and impose its taxes on us and our activities. In
response, and in our defense, the United States promised to protect us from any effort by
the State to impose its taxes on our territories.... Your oaths of office require you to
uphold American laws and treaties. Whether you do so or not is up to you, but I assure
you that we have no intention of compromising any of our treaty rights that have already
been bought and paid for through the relinquishment of most of our aboriginal rights.").
347 See Susan Asquith & Sharon Linstedt, supra note 322.
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sovereignty" in American Jurisprudence. The specific history and
relationship the State of New York has with its Indian nations, including the
Seneca Nation, and the various interests New York has invested in the
dispute, may all influence its identification and understanding of its own
sovereignty.
The Seneca Nation has its own perception of sovereignty and legitimacy
that is independent of the thoughts of the state whose borders it finds itself
within. The beliefs and perceptions on sovereignty and legitimacy held by
members of the Seneca Nation may have even evolved partly or entirely
outside of American jurisprudence. Further, the Seneca Nation's views on its
sovereign power to either adhere to or be exempt from New York's state
tobacco tax laws have been shaped by the collective interests and historical
experiences of the Seneca people. Some of these historical experiences are
represented in the treaties signed by the Seneca Nation and the federal
government. Seneca Nation sovereignty therefore exists independent of the
limits other sovereigns may place upon it and may be embodied in
documents that do not share the same deep meaning to other states, such as
New York.
Differing views on sovereignty and legitimacy complicate the
effectiveness of litigation to resolve the tobacco tax dispute. Because New
York believes itself to have the legitimate right as a sovereign State to enact
and enforce its tobacco tax laws on the Seneca Nation and its members, 348
any refusal by the Seneca Nation to recognize and comply with these laws on
Seneca land serves as a direct challenge to New York's belief in its
legitimacy to pass and enforce such laws upon the Seneca people.349
Accordingly, regardless of the specific question before the court, any legal
complaint brought by New York against the Seneca Nation or its members
348 See Executive Refusal, supra note 321, at 4 (according to the New York Standing
Committee on Investigations and Government Operations, "State taxation of tribal sales
of cigarettes to non-tribe members is not pre-empted by federal law ... [and that] the
Supreme Court and other federal courts have upheld efforts by various states to enforce
various taxing mechanisms." The Committee based its conclusion on findings that "the
United States Supreme Court has consistently held that states may tax the sale of
[tobacco] products to non-native Americans."). See also id. (citing as examples Dep't of
Taxation and Fin. of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros. Inc., 512 U.S. 61, 73-78
(1994); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 423
U.S., at 482-83; Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Rising, 477 F.3d 881, 892 (6th Cir.
2007); City of New York v. Golden Feather Smoke Shop, Inc., No. 08-CV-3966, 2009
WL 2612345 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009.).
349 See Linstedt et al., supra note 346; see also Testimony ofJ.C. Seneca, supra note
109.
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for failing to comply with state tobacco tax laws carries with it the question
of which competing sovereign has greater legitimacy in the matter. Similarly,
any complaint brought by the Seneca Nation or its members against New
York and its entities regarding the applicability of the tax to them will be
asking the court the same question.
The Seneca Nation therefore continues to claim a sovereign right to
exemption from the payment of tobacco taxes. At the same time, New York
has not moved from its position that the Seneca Nation is not exempt from
certain tobacco taxes, and that these taxes must be enforced.350 Both parties'
positions reflect unyielding beliefs about their relative sovereignty and the
legitimacy, of the other party's demands. Consequently, litigation between the
parties is a zero-sum game that the winning party will not be able to collect
upon, and to which the losing party is unlikely to comply. Fortunately,
behind these positions are several interests which have taken a back seat and
been masked during prior litigation. Exploring some of the possible interests
gives hope to future successful negotiation in a way that has not yet occurred.
It is time for the interests of both parties to come to the forefront of the
conversation.
C. The Search for Hidden Interests in Party Positions
To negotiate in good faith both parties must move past their stubborn
positions on sovereignty-at least for now-and focus instead on identifying
the underlying interests encompassed in their positions. While only the State
of New York and the Seneca Nation can truly confirm what private interests
are hidden in their public positions, the exercise of brainstorming possible
interests, and exploring the beliefs from which they were born, reframes the
discussion on the tobacco tax dispute. It gives the parties a foundation from
which they can imagine new options for mutual gain, while bypassing
completely a debate about sovereignty-thus leaving sovereignty interests
uncompromised.
1. Possible Interests Underlying New York's Position
In a 2011 speech, New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo summarized
his position on New York's tobacco tax dispute with the Seneca Nation:
"[T]axes on cigarettes sold to nontribal members must be collected because
this is revenue rightly owed to the state, and with this decision, my
350 See, e.g., Lisberg et al., supra note 4 (citing Mayor Bloomberg).
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administration will move to do so expeditiously" (emphasis added). 351 In its
battle against contraband cigarettes, New York politicians have made clear
that New York has an interest in collecting the generous revenue it feels has
been hijacked through "tax evasion" by the State's Indian nations-including
the Seneca Nation. Former New York Senator Anthony Weiner, for example,
claimed in 2010 that New York had lost over $1 billion to evaded taxes by
the State's Indian nations-revenue which Weiner believed should be
rightfully returned to New York. 352 It has additionally been argued that New
York could bring in over $100 million a year if it successfully enforced the
PACT Act and state tax codes on Indian land. 353
Yet while New York's financial interest in collecting the excise tobacco
tax from the Seneca Nation is compelling, it is by no means the only interest.
New York's general financial interest can be further broken down into the
following smaller, and more revealing, possible interests:
a. Funding for Social Objectives
The State of New York's general financial interest in collecting state
excise tobacco taxes from members of the Seneca Nation includes an interest
in funding programs that further legitimate social objectives. In particular,
New York has funds state programs aimed at preventing and combating the
negative effects of tobacco use by New York citizens.354 Seventy-six percent
of the revenue collected from excise cigarette taxation in New York funds
the tobacco control and initiatives pool from which the state funds major
health initiatives. 355 The remaining twenty-four percent goes into the state's
351 Precious & Herbeck, supra note 318 (quoting former Governor Andrew M.
Cuomo).
352 PREVENT ALL CIGARETTE TRAFFICKING ACT OF 2009, 156 Cong. Rec.
1526-01 (2010) (statement of N.Y. Sen. Anthony Weiner), 2010 WL 956208 at 26
[hereinafter PACT ACT].
353 See Tom Precious, State Launches Crackdown on Reservation Cigarettes,
BUFFALO NEWS, (July 13, 2011), www.buffalonews.com/cityarticle488070.ece (reporting
that the Cuomo administration released this estimate assuming the state collects a
maximum of $4.35 in tax on each pack of cigarettes).
354 See generally MICAH BERMAN & MARLO MIURA, CENTER FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
AND TOBACCO POLICY: CIGARETTE TAX EVASION IN NEW YORK (2011), available at
http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/nycenter-policybrief-
cigtaxevasion-2011 .pdf [hereinafter TAX EVASION IN NEW YORK].
355 Id.
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general fund.356 Additionally, New York uses the revenue it generates from
state tobacco taxes to fund preventative programs geared towards preventing
smoking-related diseases.357 These programs raise public awareness of the
risks and hazards of cigarette and tobacco use, provide assistance to
individuals who are trying to quit using tobacco products, and strive to
change cultural norms and perceptions within the state about tobacco use. 358
As part of its preventative efforts, New York has taken a strong stance
against internet vendors selling tobacco products from Indian country absent
any tax. New York's protest of Indian internet vendors who ship tax-free
tobacco products to sellers outside of Indian Country is due in part to the
high potential revenues a successful tax on such sales could bring.359
However, New York has also expressed concern that Indian internet vendors
have become an increasingly popular way for youth to unlawfully access
cigarettes and other tobacco products. 360 This leaves open the frightening
356 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 482(b) (McKinney 2010); Cf N.Y. State S. Fin. Comm.,
2010 Mid-Year Report on Receipts and Disbursements at 31, Nov. 2010 available at
http://www.nysenate.gov/press-release/new-york-state-senate-finance-committee-2010-
mid-year-report-receipts-and-disbursement (noting that the rules controlling distributions
from the tobacco control and insurance initiatives pool are found in the Public Health
section of the state law). See also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-v (2010).
357 TAX EVASION IN NEW YORK, supra note 354, at 2.
35.8 See id. at 5 (noting that New York has both a social and a financial goal in
preventing and reducing tobacco use because "for every dollar spent on tobacco control
programs, over three dollars are saved in 'avoided direct medical costs,"' but that in
2011, the amount of state spending for tobacco control programs in New York was at its
lowest since 1999, with funding for tobacco control programs cut by 30% in 2010 due to
state budget shortfalls). See also N.Y. State Tobacco Control Program, Leading the Way
Toward a Tobacco-Free Society: 2010-2013 (2010) available at
http://www.nyhealth.gov/prevention/tobacco control/docs/leadingthe way_2010_2013.
pdf (stating that New York generates about $1.4 billion in state tobacco tax revenue, but
then spends about $8.17 billion a year on health care costs related to smoking related
illnesses, with approximately $5.47 billion coming from New York's state Medicaid
fund).
359 See Kevin Davis et al., Cigarette Purchasing Patterns Among New York
Smokers: Implications for Health, Price, and Revenue, New York State Department of
Health March 2006, at 15 (noting that in 2004, New York reported it had lost between
$106 million and $ 122 million in tax revenue from Internet and telephone cigarette
vendors).
360 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-641, CIGARETTE SMUGGLING:
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AND SEIZURES INCREASING, at 7 (2004) (reporting
that according to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, "some cigarette
smugglers have ties with terrorist groups, and there are indications that terrorist group
involvement in illicit cigarette trafficking, as well as the relationship between criminal
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image of Indian internet vendors selling tax-free cigarettes at substantially
low prices without asking for identification or age verification.361
b. Protecting New York Citizens Against National Security Threats
Unregulated and effectively untaxed internet tobacco venders in Indian
Country create a prime opportunity for terrorists to fund their activities-an
event any state would want to discourage. Individuals engaging in terrorism
can purchase large quantities of untaxed cigarettes and resell them on the
black market at prices lower than states with hefty tobacco taxes, but higher
than their purchase price.362 The Governing Accounting Office ("GAO")
legitimized New York's concern in this matter when it linked cigarette
smuggling in New York to Hezbollah and other international terrorist
organizations. According to the GAO, terrorists purchase contraband
cigarettes, resell them in a more expensive state, and then use the profits to
fund illicit activities.363
groups and terrorist groups, will grow in the future because of the large profits that can be
made.").
361 See Postal Cooperative Mail and Nonmailable Tobacco: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia, 110th
Cong., (April 24, 2008) (statement of William V. Corr., Executive Director of Campaign
for Tobacco Free-Kids), 2008 WL 1839293, [hereinafter Eliminating Smoke and Mirrors]
at 2 (explaining that one reason New York officials are concerned with Internet vendors
that do not verify the purchaser's age is that Internet sellers typically set their minimum
purchase requirement of cigarettes as low as two cartons, "which can turn youth who buy
cigarettes over the Internet into suppliers for other underage smokers as well."); see also
Eric Lindblom, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Internet Sales of Tobacco Products:
Reaching Kids and Evading Taxes, Apr. 2008, available at
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0213.pdf.
362 See Michael Beebe, Cigarette Smuggling Conspiracy nets Prison for 2 Seneca
Women, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 14, 2004, at B2 (reporting that in April of 2004, members
of the Seneca Nation were convicted of selling untaxed cigarettes to individuals
connected to Hezbollah who were operating a smuggling ring on the black market). See
also Republican Staff of U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Tobacco and
Terror: How Cigarette Smuggling is Funding Our Enemies Abroad (2008), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/412462/tobacco-and-terror-
how-cigarette-smuggling-is.pdf (detailing federal concerns about terrorism and illicit
cigarette trafficking).
363 See 146 CONG. REC. S1480-87 (daily ed. March 11, 2010)(statement of Sen.
Herb Kohl) (describing an incident in November of 2009 where BATFE charged 14
people with paying over $8 million, 40 firearms, and drugs, to buy 77 million contraband
cigarettes to sell in New York. Kohl praised the bill for finally giving state law
enforcement officers the enforcement tools they needed to manage the dangers associated
with contraband cigarette sales).
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c. Preventing Job Diversion and Capitalizing on the 1998 Phillip
Morris Settlement Agreement
The State of New York's efforts to prevent tobacco-related illnesses and
keeping cigarettes out of the hands of youth are not new. Yet, the high level
of enthusiasm Phillip Morris and other big name New York tobacco
manufacturers share over the enforcement of the terms of the PACT Act
make New York and its big brand tobacco industries look like strange
bedfellows. One possible explanation is that an Indian nation production
scheme which bypasses state taxation laws would shift jobs away from state
tobacco workers and onto Indian land.364 It would also reduce the high level
of competitiveness traditionally enjoyed by the state's major tobacco
corporations. 365 Such a scheme would additionally greatly decrease the
amount of money tobacco corporations within New York are required to pay
as a result of the 1998 settlement agreement 366 between the major American
tobacco companies and the Attorney Generals of forty-six states-with one
of those forty-six states being New York. 367
364 See Toensing, supra note 3 (reporting that without enforcement of New York's
tobacco tax on Indian retailers, changes in state law which have encouraged Indian
nations to manufacture cigarettes on their own land instead of purchasing from other
wholesalers for resale have resulted in a decrease of sales for New York's wholesalers by
20-30%).
365 See id. (reporting that the overnight success of Indian nation tobacco retailers has
resulted in cigarette plants once operated by Phillip Morris in Western New York to
transfer its business to Indian nation tobacco producers and away from Phillip).
366 The Tobacco Control Resource Center, Inc., The Multistate Master Settlement
Agreement and the Future of State and Local Tobacco Control: An Analysis of Selected
Topics and Provisions of the Multistate Master Settlement Agreement of November 23,
1998 [hereinafter MSA].
367 See Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking Act of 2007 and the Smuggled Tobacco
Prevention Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 4081 and H.R. 3689 Before H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 53 (2008) (statement of Matthew L. Myers, President of the
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids [hereinafter "PACT Act & STOP Act Hearing"]
(stating that "contraband cigarette trafficking can also reduce the annual tobacco
settlement payments to the states. Former Senator Anthony Weiner was one such New
York politician, and was accordingly instrumental in the passage of the PACT Act. Those
settlement payments are supposed to be adjusted downward based on the U.S. cigarette
consumption declines-but the MSA formulas are based solely on changes to legal
cigarette sales. When smokers shift to illegal cigarettes, consumption does not actually
decline, but payments to the states do."). See also Kaplan, supra note 8 (quoting David
Sutton, a spokesperson for Altria, the parent company of Phillip Morris, the country's
largest cigarette manufacturer as saying: "All cigarettes sold to non-Native American
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d. For New York Elected Officials: Gaining Political Capital
For New York elected officials there is a potential personal interest in
successfully achieving compliance by Indian nations in collecting state
tobacco taxes. 368 First, the tax is one of the rare situations in which a tax
increase creates a win-win outcome for the elected official.369 An increased
cigarette tax not only generates a legitimate revenue "windfall" for many
local jurisdictions, but also, the move at a political level is one in which the
elected official is often praised for making a socially undesirable commodity
more expensive, and thus, in theory, more difficult to obtain.370 Second,
collection of the tax creates revenue for New York's public agencies and
special interest groups, which is especially desirable by groups in fields
related to health or public employment.
Accordingly, some New York politicians have historically asserted state
sovereignty in their justification of efforts to regulate Seneca tobacco
production when they feel that doing so is not only in the best interest of the
state's citizens, but will also put themselves in a favorable light with
constituents. 371 Like any government, New York's state sovereignty is
shaped in part by the legitimacy its subjects bestow upon its leaders and
elected officials to govern them. This legitimacy, however, is given in
exchange for the leaders promising to use that power to benefit the popular
interest and public good. The popular interest and public good is often
carried out by public agencies and special interest groups, which raises the
stakes on the politicians responsible for generating the necessary revenue for
their operation.
2. Possible Interests Underlying the Seneca Nation's Position
Council Chairman for the Seneca Nation, J.C. Seneca made the position
of the Seneca Nation clear when he declared: "We're never going to succumb
New Yorkers need to be tax-paid-regardless of who manufactures them-or New York
State will continue to lose legitimate and significant tax revenue, and law-abiding
retailers will continue to be impacted by cigarette tax evasion.").
368 See PACT Act & STOP Act Hearing, supra note 367 (noting that former Sen.
Weiner was one such figure who was instrumental the passage of the PACT Act).
369 See Sirois, supra note 167, at 34.
370 See id. at 35 (describing the tobacco tax on Indian nation sales to non-Indians as
"an enhancement of sumptuary or so-called 'sin taxes,"' which are already popularly
leveled on tobacco as a way to "discourage the consumption of tobacco, yet also
constitute a stable source of revenue for taxing jurisdictions").
371 See supra Section II.
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to the state collecting taxes from us" (emphasis added).372 The unyielding
language in the Council Chairman's statement reflects the belief among
many members of the Seneca Nation that the tobacco tax dispute is
inexorably linked to their interest in protecting the sovereignty of their
people.373 But while the Seneca Nation's strong defense of their position on
sovereignty may seemingly complicate negotiations between the Seneca
Nation and New York, it by no means removes the option of negotiation
from the table. Instead, the possibility of dynamic interests and beliefs woven
into the fabric of the Seneca Nation's position on sovereignty make the
dispute between the two sovereigns ripe for negotiation.
The Seneca Nation's position and the fundamental purpose it serves of
protecting the Nation's sovereignty is not so stubborn as to prohibit the State
of New York from successfully negotiating with them in good faith. The
Seneca Nation's position does, however, require New York to acknowledge
the legitimacy of Seneca's sovereign beliefs and to treat the Nation with the
type of respect it would give to any other sovereign entity. While New York
has attempted this feat by making statements saying that it respects and
recognizes Seneca Nation sovereignty,374 its actions have painted a very
372 See Precious & Herbeck, supra note 318 (quoting J.C. Seneca, of Irving, a major
Seneca tobacco retailer and manufacturer who currently serves as Council Chairman for
the Nation).
373 See Fink, supra note 313 (quoting Seneca Nation President Robert Odawi Porter
responding to a New York Appellate Ruling which allowed New York to collect past due
sales tax on tobacco sales made on sovereign Indian territory to non-Indians: "We will
continue to block the state's long-standing crusade to confiscate our national wealth,
sacrifice native and non-native jobs and interfere with our way of life.... For more than
200 years, the Seneca Nation has thwarted New York State's efforts to steal our land,
destroy our sovereignty, and tax commerce in our territories. In our treaties with the
United States, we gave up most of our land to retain the 'free use and enjoyment' to
conduct business in our remaining territories free from the state's taxes. New York will
never collect a cent of revenue from tobacco sales occurring in our territories, and
revenue projections so indicating are foolishness.").
374 See INDIAN LAW § 6; Fellows v. Denniston, 23 N.Y. 420, 425 (1861), rev'd on
other grounds; In re the New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1866) (recognizing the legal
doctrine of "tribal sovereignty" since 1861, which has been recognized by New York is
not to enact laws that interfere with tribal self-government). See also Executive Refusal,
supra note 322, at 4 (defining "tribal sovereignty" as understood by New York to mean
that its Indian nations have the right to "exercise their inherent power to govern their own
internal affairs"); Michelle O'Donnell, Tax on Sales at Indian Reservations Blocked,"
NEW YoRK TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004 (quoting former New York Governor Pataki, justifying
his vetoing of a bill that would have taxed cigarettes sold to non-Indians on Indian land:
"One of the important things I've strived to do is reflect the sovereignty as guaranteed by
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different picture.375 In particular, the Seneca Nation often finds its
differences with New York over the tobacco tax dispute met with a unilateral
piece of state legislation specifying its demands for the Seneca Nation and
the consequences for noncompliance. 376 Thus, while New York may claim to
have attempted compromise, its efforts to enforce legislation and regulations
that have been unilaterally drafted and passed. This is the antithesis of New
York showing the Seneca Nation-or any other sovereign entity-that it
respects their sovereignty.
Any exploration of party interests is futile if the Seneca Nation is denied
the full respect of a sovereign government to sit at the bargaining table with
New York as an equal. Giving full government respect to Seneca Nation
sovereignty requires New York to stop treating its unilaterally passed
legislation as having a greater weight of authority than the ideas or pleas for
negotiation coming from the Seneca leaders. Failure to do so will throw off
the power dynamic, tempt the parties to resort back into their positions, and
then eventually force the dispute back in zero-sum litigation. While the
interests protected by the Seneca Nation's position on sovereignty might bee
dynamic and plentiful, the Seneca Nation lacks any incentive to negotiate
upon them if they do not feel New York views their contributions to the
negotiation as coming from an equal. 377 Yet, if New York treats the Seneca
Nation as a sovereign at the bargaining table, both parties can remove
sovereignty from the agenda items and instead negotiate upon the full range
of interests just as New York would negotiate with any other sovereign.378 It
state and federal treaties, and to negotiate in good faith. . . . I believe we can do this
through consent, where we can reach agreement with the tribal nations.").
375 See Testimony of Robert Odawi Porter, supra note 317.
376 Id
377 See Tom Precious, State Drops Collection of Taxes on Indian Cigarettes, Writes
off Revenue from Reservation Sales, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 15, 2009 (reporting that
Governor Paterson told the media he wanted to resolve the dispute through negotiation;
however, very early on critics had warned that "with the stakes so lucrative, the Indian
tribes, especially the Senecas, have little reason to negotiate"). See also Fink, supra note
313 (noting that in 2011, Seneca Nation President Robert Odawi Porter announced that
the Seneca Nation was embarking on a "'new era' by manufacturing and selling its own
brand of cigarettes," and that "[t]raditional premium brands of cigarettes will not be sold
from businesses operating on sovereign territory." Porter explained that he wanted "to
make sure the Seneca's tobacco economy is 'sustained and regulated."').
378 See Testimony of Robert Odawi Porter, supra note 317, at 3 (suggesting "that the
promise of tax reform will have the most impact if it advances the first principles that are
at the foundation of federal Indian policy at its best-tribal nations are governments
whose exclusive authority to govern all economic activity on their territory is fully
respected as a matter of federal law. . . If the goal is to increase economic growth in
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would then no longer matter what positions and beliefs each party held about
their sovereignty or the sovereignty of the other, as sovereignty would no
longer be on the negotiation agenda. The process of negotiating in good faith
as equals protects the sovereignty interest of both parties without making it a
negotiation item or a roadblock to settlement.
The rest of this section discusses possible interests which may underlie
the Seneca Nation's position in the tobacco tax dispute with New York. In
discussing the possible merit of these interests, it is assumed that the parties
will negotiate as equal sovereigns in a manner conducive to respecting the
sovereignty of each.
a. Preserving the Integrity of the Treaty of Canandaigua
The Seneca Nation holds great pride in the recognition of their status as a
sovereign nation under the Treaty of Canandaigua almost 217 years ago.379
This treaty-which explicitly bestows the right upon the Seneca Nation to
the "free use and enjoyment" of their lands-is often viewed as the basis for
the level of freedom and economic success which the Seneca people
enjoy.380 The Seneca Nation was the only Indian nation to have succeeded in
securing its land in western New York despite an aggressive state removal
policy.381 Accordingly, their ability to secure the survival of their people was
assured with the Treaty of Canandaigua.382 This story of survival provides
the backdrop to the Seneca Nation's refusal to comply with any New York
law or regulation that violates their sovereignty as established by the terms
agreed to in the Treaty of Canandaigua. 383
Indian Country, tribal territories must be recognized as places of economic opportunity
for tribal governments and tribal citizens.").
379 See Testimony of Robert Odawi Porter, supra note 317, at 1.
380 See id. at 2 (testifying that "[t]he key promises made to us by the United States in
the Canandaigua Treaty ... has served as the basis for a level of freedom possessed by
the Seneca people that is among the highest levels of all indigenous peoples in the United
States. Because of this treaty-protected freedom, our Nation has been able to achieve
some success in recovering from nearly 200 years of economic deprivation inflicted upon
us by the United States due to devastating losses of our land and resources." Porter says
the Treaty has brought benefits to both the Seneca Nation government and Seneca
citizens, "primarily on available business involving tobacco, gambling, and ancillary
ventures.").
381 See Hopkins, supra note 116.
382 See Testimony of Robert Odawi Porter, supra note 317, at 2.
383 See Seneca Nation of Indians, Keeper of the Western Door, 2012, available at
sni.org/culture/treaties (stating that the Seneca Nation believes the rights and obligations
provided for in the Treaty of Canandaigua Treaty are protected according to Article VI of
836
[Vol. 28:3 2013]
NEGOTIATING PAST SOVEREIGNTY POSITIONS
Further, because of what the Treaty of Canandaigua represents to
members of the Seneca Nation, the Seneca Nation cannot comply to the
terms of any state law unilaterally drafted or which directly violates the
Treaty without also giving up-at least symbolically-the victories clenched
by their ancestors who fought to protect the existence of their people as a
sovereign nation. It has not been forgotten by the Seneca people that with the
signing of the Treaty of Canandaigua, the Seneca Nation surrendered much
of its land to in return for the sovereign rights it aims to protect today. 384
The Seneca Nation's ability to protect the integrity of the Treaty of
Canandaigua is at stake in its tobacco tax dispute with New York. This is
because the Treaty of Canandaigua provides immunity from all federal and
state taxation upon their people or their lands.385 Consequently, passing of
legislation or enactment of regulations by the state which essentially taxes or
regulates Seneca tobacco without the Seneca Nation's consent, puts the
Seneca Nation at risk for further encroachment into the rights their ancestors
secured in the signing the Treaty of Canandaigua.
b. Providing Economic Security and Self-Sufficiency
The Seneca Nation has a significant economic interest in not paying the
state tobacco tax. Seneca Nation President Robert Odawi Porter has made
clear that "[t]here is a direct link between the harsh poverty and devastating
unemployment that has long existed in Indian County and the taxation and
regulation by other governments of activities in [its] tribal territories.386
Taxes on tobacco sales would greatly weaken the competitive advantage
Seneca Nation retailers currently have over state retailers. 387 The
enforcement of a tobacco tax has also been found by the New York Court of
the U.S. Constitution, like all other treaties, and therefore are the "supreme law of the
land." As such, the Seneca Nation find the "protection of treaty rights [to be] a critical
part of the federal American Indian trust relationship.").
384 See Testimony of Robert Odawi Porter, supranote 317, at 2 (explaining that
these rights and promises included recognition of the Seneca Nation as a sovereign
nation, insurance that Seneca property and activities would not be taxed, that the Nation
would forever secure title to their lands, and that the United States would expressly
guarantee the Seneca Nation would retain the "free use and enjoyment of their lands").
385 Id
386 Id at 2-3 (explaining that "[w]hile there are many factors that contribute to the
economic underdevelopment of Indian Country, tax burdens imposed by external
governments contribute to making Indian country in some cases the last place in America
where meaningful capital investment and job creation will occur").
387 See id
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Appeals to adversely impact over 3,000 individuals employed in the Seneca
tobacco economy. 388 The Seneca Nation has fought hard to protect its recent
economy, and its leaders compare its current efforts to sustain economic
success with its tireless fight to protect its lands.389 New York's current
efforts have thus been viewed by some Seneca leaders as predatory acts by
those who "seek to deprive [the Seneca] of economic prosperity and return
[them] to the poverty of a prior era." 390
Economic success from their thriving tobacco industry also increases the
self-sufficiency of the Seneca Nation. Increased self-sufficiency allows for
the Seneca Nation's government to better provide for its people without
having to seek state or federal assistance. Assistance often comes in the form
of subsidies, which require the undesirable signing of contracts saturated
with entanglement language that would place the Seneca Nation at risk for
future encroachment by both state and federal government. Encroachment
could create further dependency, weaken the Seneca Nation government, and
leave the Seneca Nation with less bargaining power and legitimacy from both
its people and the outside world. 391
Losing the tobacco tax dispute accordingly has the potential to decrease
the strength and self-sufficiency of the Seneca Nation government and its
people, all while dismantling its potential to become an increasingly
important player in the tobacco business.
c. Increasing Power and Prestige for the Seneca Nation
A couple centuries ago, the level of economic success enjoyed today by
the Seneca Nation would have been unthinkable to most.392 But with a
historically tumultuous relationship between the Seneca Nation, and state and
federal government, contemporary economic gains by the Seneca Nation
388 See Seneca Nation of Indians v. State of New York, 89 A.D.3d 1536 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2011) (finding that after the completion of a Jobs Impact Statement by the State
Finance Department which confirmed the devastating impact, the negative economic
impact to Indian reservations from the state's cigarette law was caused by the law itself,
and not by regulations adopted to carry out the law, and therefore the regulations were
lawfully adopted).
389 See Testimony of Robert Odawi Porter, supra note 317, at 2.
390 See id.
391 See id. (emphasizing that it has taken the Seneca Nation over 200 years to get to
where it is today, and that its people have succeeded despite devastating losses of both
their lands and resources).
392 See id. (noting the high level of economic success of the Seneca people relative
to other indigenous populations in the United States).
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represent more than a financial benefit to the Seneca people. For any
sovereign government-including the Seneca Nation-economic
independence and self-sufficiency is an expression of sovereign legitimacy.
Thus, economic growth and success reaffirms to New York, the federal
government, and the outside world in general, that the Seneca Nation is
worthy of its sovereign title, and that in its sovereign capacity it provides for
its people without depending on New York or the federal government for
assistance.
V. CONCLUSION
"The very concept of sovereignty suggests that a government
maintains the ability to govern freely without unsolicited interference
from compeer bodies." (emphasis added). 393
The conflict between the Seneca Nation and the State of New York is
undeniably convoluted and seemingly intractable. Yet, perhaps this is simply
the inevitable endgame for a dispute that has been battled for far too long in a
legal arena unsuitable to its unique and complex needs. In the adversarial
litigation progress which serves as the hallmark of the American legal
system, disputes are ruled on by judges constrained by intricate rules of
jurisdiction and legislative canons of interpretations. The arguments heard by
judges are prepared by lawyers trained to argue their client's position within
the confines of the legal traditions of the United States. While this judicial
framework in the United States has successfully handled many difficult
disputes for more than two centuries, its merits decline significantly when
positions taken by the parties to a dispute have deeply historical and personal
sovereignty interests attached to them which the system is unable to
address. 394
This has proved true in the dispute between the Seneca Nation and the
State of New York over the taxation of tobacco products sold on reservation
land to non-members. Courts have consistently refused to provide a
definitive ruling on the merits of the Seneca Nation's claim in defense to
New York's tax laws that it has sovereign immunity under treaties it signed
with the federal government. 395 Yet, while courts may continue to decline to
393 Sirois, supra note 167, at 68.
394 d.
395 Dep't of Taxation & Fin. of New York v. Milhelm Attea Bros., Inc., 512 U.S.
61, 77 n. 11 (1994)("We do not address this contention, which differs markedly from
respondent's position and which was not addressed by the Court of Appeals.").
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rule on the merits of the Seneca Nation's complaint, the Seneca Nation
remains astutely aware of the wounds it suffered as a result of more than a
century of "predatory" efforts by New York to infringe upon the rights set
forth in its treaties.
By the same mark, New York has been attempting to assert influence
over its Indian nations for centuries, only to be unilaterally blocked almost
every time by defenses rooted in the language of federal treaties. However,
with the recent trend of courts declining to address the merits of claims
brought before it on the issue of sovereign immunity, New York has a
window of opportunity to try and take back some control over its Indian
nations that it might have lost under federal treaties.
This process produces a zero-sum result. As previously established, the
adversarial litigation process forces parties to argue positions-which is what
both parties to the tobacco tax debacle have already done. History has further
entangled each party's position with interests in sovereignty, such that all
wins and losses in the courtroom over asserted positions translate to wins and
losses of sovereignty by the parties in the real world. Considering the Seneca
Nation's historical battle to maintain its sovereignty over centuries of state
encroachment, it is unlikely to concede to state taxation laws which infringe
upon the same principle of sovereign immunity it has fought to protect. The
process polarizes the two parties-making it nearly impossible to find
options for mutual gain-and instead leaves both parties in a race to find and
assert the strongest position to represent its interests in court.
Taking the dispute outside of the traditional legal realm and placing it
into a negotiation setting allows both parties to work toward resolution by
using a process that does not require either party to formally accept the
sovereignty position of the other. Each party would be met at the bargaining
table as an equal, which enables each to free themselves from positions they
previously used to protect their sovereignty interests. Both parties would be
invited to explore the multitude of economic, health, security, social, cultural
survival, and self-sufficiency interests that have taken a backseat in the
dispute for far too long. In this proposed process, as the parties begin to
introduce other underlying interests, new alternatives and options for mutual
gain will present themselves-upon which the foundation for a sustainable
resolution may begin to take form.
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